# 1NC vs Houston FL

## Off

### T-USFG

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### This does not exclude performance, dictate evidence type, or assume the judge’s role – only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD, 1987. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government

The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases, 1964. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws – vote neg

#### 1. Competition – the Neg should win on average 50 percent of the time – any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose – their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash – debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third and fourth line responses – that’s key to politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs – their interp explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

## Case

### 1NC – Extinction o/w

#### Extinction outweighs

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### 1NC – Regulated Cap

#### Regulated capitalism solves war, environment, and quality of life---alternatives increase degradation and poverty---prefer empirical and measurable indicators.

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Discourse on food ethics often advocates the anti-capitalist idea that we need less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization if we want to make the world a better and more equitable place, with arguments focused on applications to food, globalization, and a just society. For example, arguments for this anti-capitalist view are at the core of some chapters in nearly every handbook and edited volume in the rapidly expanding subdiscipline of food ethics. None of these volumes (or any article published in this subdiscipline broadly construed) focuses on a defense of globalized capitalism.1

More generally, discourse on global ethics, environment, and political theory in much of academia—and in society—increasingly features this anti-capitalist idea as well.2 The idea is especially prominent in discourse surrounding the environment, climate, and global poverty, where we face a nexus of problems of which capitalism is a key driver, including climate change, air and water pollution, the challenge of feeding the world, ensuring sustainable development for the world's poorest, and other interrelated challenges.

It is therefore important to ask whether this anti-capitalist idea is justified by reason and evidence that is as strong as the degree of confidence placed in it by activists and many commentators on food ethics, global ethics, and political theory, more generally.

In fact, many experts argue that this anti-capitalist idea is not supported by reason and argument and is actually wrong. The main contribution of this essay is to explain the structure of the leading arguments against the anti-capitalist idea, and in favor of the opposite conclusion. I begin by focusing on the general argument in favor of well-regulated globalized capitalism as the key to a just, flourishing, and environmentally healthy world. This is the most important of all of the arguments in terms of its consequences for health, wellbeing, and justice, and it is endorsed by experts in the empirically minded disciplines best placed to analyze the issue, including experts in long-run global development, human health, wellbeing, economics, law, public policy, and other related disciplines. On the basis of the arguments outlined below, well-regulated capitalism has been endorsed by recent Democratic presidents of the United States such as Barack Obama, and by progressive Nobel laureates who have devoted their lives to human development and more equitable societies, as well as by a wide range of experts in government and leading nongovernmental organizations.

The goal of this essay is to make the structure and importance of these arguments clear, and thereby highlight that discourse on global ethics and political theory should engage carefully with them. The goal is not to endorse them as necessarily sound and correct. The essay will begin by examining general arguments for and against capitalism, and then turn to implications for food, the environment, climate change, and beyond.

Arguments for and against Forms of Capitalism

The Argument against Capitalism

Capitalism is often argued to be a key driver of many of society's ills: inequalities, pollution, land use changes, and incentives that cause people to live differently than in their ideal dreams. Capitalism can sometimes deepen injustices. These negative consequences are easy to see—resting, as they do, at the center of many of society's greatest challenges.3

And at the same time, it is often difficult to see the positive consequences of capitalism.4 What are the positive consequences of allowing private interests to clear-cut forests and plant crops, especially if those private interests are rich multinational corporations and the forests are in poor, developing countries whose citizens do not receive the profits from deforestation? Why give private companies the right to exploit resources at all, since exploitation almost always has some negative consequences such as those listed above? These are the right questions to ask, and they highlight genuine challenges to capitalism. And in light of these challenges, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that perhaps a different economic system altogether would be more equitable and beneficial to the global population.

The Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism

However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that capitalism is not the fundamental cause of the previously described problems but rather an essential component of the best solutions to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But that does not mean that we should turn against them—quite the opposite. Instead, we should embrace them as essential to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or if they will instead finally gain access to what is minimally necessary for basic health and wellbeing and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

* optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9
* ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10
* ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and
* ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world's population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor well-regulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

Conclusion. Therefore, we should be in favor of capitalism over noncapitalism, and we should especially favor well-regulated capitalism, which is the ethically optimal economic system and is essential to any just basic structure for society.

This argument is impressive because, as stated earlier in the essay, it is based on evidence that is so striking that it leads a bipartisan range of open-minded thinkers and activists to endorse well-regulated capitalism, including many of those who were not initially attracted to the view because of a reasonable concern for the societal ills with which we began. To better understand why such a range of thinkers could agree that well-regulated capitalism is best, it may help to clarify some things that are not assumed or implied by the argument for it, which could be invoked by other bad arguments for capitalism.

One thing the argument above does not assume is that health, wellbeing, or justice are the same thing as wealth, because, in fact, they are not. Instead, the argument above relies on well-accepted, measurable indicators of health and wellbeing, such as increased lifespan; decreased early childhood mortality; adequate nutrition; and other empirically measurable leading indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice.17 Similarly, the argument that capitalism promotes justice, peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance relies on empirical metrics for each of these.18

Furthermore, the argument does not assume that because these indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice are highly correlated with high degrees of capitalism, that therefore capitalism is the direct cause of these good outcomes. Rather, the analyses suggest instead that something other than capitalism is the direct cause of societal improvements (such as improvements in knowledge and technology, public infrastructure, and good governance), and that capitalism is simply a necessary condition for these improvements to happen.19 In other words, the richer a society is, the more it is able to invest in all of these and other things that are the direct causes of health, wellbeing, and justice. But, to maximize investment in these things societies need well-regulated capitalism.

As part of these analyses, it is often stressed that current forms of capitalism around the world are highly defective and must be reformed in the direction of well-regulated capitalism because they lack investments in public goods, such as basic knowledge, healthcare, nutrition, other safety nets, and good governance.20 In this way, an argument for a particular kind of progressive reformism is an essential part of the analyses that lead many to endorse the more general argument for well-regulated capitalism.

Although these analyses are nuanced, and appropriately so, it remains the case that the things that directly lead to health, wellbeing, and justice require resources, and the best path toward generating those resources is well-regulated capitalism. And on the flip side, according to the analyses behind premise 1 described above, an anti-capitalist system would not produce the resources that are needed, and would thus be a disaster, especially for the poorest billion people who are most desperately in need of the resources that capitalism can create and direct, to escape from extreme poverty.2

### 1NC – Innovation Leadership

#### Replacing the consumer welfare standard causes business uncertainty that hikes costs and decreases innovation.

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Yet these critiques of consumer welfare miss the mark. Abandoning this approach in favor of broad-based interventionist antitrust policies would prove harmful. Proposed reforms such as breaking up dominant firms or prohibiting most mergers and acquisitions are likely to make consumers worse off, sacrificing the cost reductions that result from one firm producing a growing share of output and integrating many complementary services. Considering a broader range of conduct to be in violation of antitrust law would likely increase uncertainty for firms as they endeavor to compete to attract additional customers. Moreover, having to assign weights to ill-defined objectives of labor rights and fairness (among other new goals) would create confusion. The resulting decisions could be arbitrary and inconsistent with the rule of law. Furthermore, oft-cited studies claiming that competition is weakening are based on questionable evidence. The 2020 Economic Report of the President showed that those studies rely on overbroad market definitions that tell us nothing about competition in specific markets, let alone across the entire economy. What’s more, while leading digital platforms often have large market shares, they still face competitive pressure from existing firms and startups to develop innovative new products and services. Indeed, market-leading platforms that fail to innovate can be displaced — just ask Yahoo and MySpace. Finally, the benefits that consumers derive from participating in some digital platforms will grow as the platforms expand their membership. Antitrust attacks aimed at “cutting monopoly platforms down to size” could undermine these benefits, harming consumers. The antitrust consumer-welfare standard has served consumers well. Competitive forces have yielded a bounty of highly affordable and greatly enhanced digital products and services. The pace of innovation has been breathtaking. The last thing we should do is quickly impose new and amorphous antitrust restrictions that threaten this success story.

#### Failure to sustain innovation leadership makes a China war inevitable.

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The global economy has become more integrated, with China’s economy growing strongly—poised to soon take over the United States at market exchange rates and having already done so in terms of purchasing power parity. More importantly, China has become the top trading partner and creditor/investor for many countries. The size and penetration of the Chinese economy have rendered a strategy of containing China impractical and costly to all sides, and makes the US-China contention more protracted and difficult.

The West thus faces a dilemma: Efforts to decouple from China in order to limit its influence would hurt not only China but also Western countries and the global economy more broadly, but striking a trade deal with China to reduce tensions will likely help the Chinese economy perform better, making the strategic competition with Beijing more intractable.

The rivalry has slowly led to a bifurcation of the global economy, most discernible in high-tech areas such as the tension between digital authoritarianism and digital liberalism, artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies, satellite-based navigation for civilian and military uses, and 5G/6G telecommunications.

A balanced assessment

It’s important to remember that China has many weaknesses, including an aging population with a shrunken labor force, a secular decline in labor productivity, high levels of debt, environmental degradation, and social and economic inequalities. It is still an open question whether China can graduate from its old and trusted development model of mobilizing massive investment for exports to one driven by innovation—a model that tends not to thrive under political control.

However, it is equally important not to underestimate the domestic challenges facing the United States and several European countries. Confronted by aging populations and declining productivity, many affluent Western countries have been beset by populist backlashes against economic inequalities and social problems. Especially in the United States, the division has deepened to the extent that there is no shared perception of reality, let alone common ground for debate. This makes it difficult for the United States to build political consensus behind any sustained actions needed to deal with its challenges—even though the country has managed to overcome difficulties in the past and could do so again.

With or without the label “cold war,” the United States and China are locked in a protracted conflict over core national values, including economic and geopolitical interests. The fact that the Chinese economy is stronger than the Soviet Union’s decrepit economy, playing a key role in integrated global supply chains, while many Western countries suffer from internal divisions, makes the strategic competition more challenging for the West than the Cold War of the late twentieth century was. Of particular concern is the fact that the United States has suffered a steep fall in its Freedom House “Freedom in the World” score since 2010, denting much of its soft power. Consequently, the contestants in today’s conflict appear to be more evenly matched, making for a difficult struggle ahead—whatever you want to call it.

#### Chinese technological rise is demonstrably worse---causes global instability and conflict.

Alan W. Dowd 21. Senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. "Capstones: China’s Dream, the World’s Nightmare – Sagamore Institute". No Publication. 4-5-2021. https://sagamoreinstitute.org/capstones-chinas-dream-the-worlds-nightmare/

If China is indeed the future, if China is primed to “rule the world,” if China remakes the international order in its image, it won’t be pretty. A future dominated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be demonstrably worse than the world we know. Just look at how Xi Jinping’s regime treats its own subjects—and plays its current role on the global stage.

NO RIGHTS

Those predictions aren’t outlandish. China already is the world’s top manufacturing nation, top exporting nation and second-largest economy. The PRC was the only major economy to emerge from 2020 claiming GDP growth (if we are to trust Beijing’s books). In the pandemic’s wake, China dislodged the U.S. as the world’s primary destination for foreign direct investment. PRC-backed firms are leaders in the global 5G and AI race. On the strength of a 517-percent binge in military spending since 2000, China bristles with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, deploys a high-tech air force, has a growing and openly hostile presence in space, is doubling its nuclear arsenal, and boasts a 350-ship navy (now the world’s largest). Beijing’s growing cultural reach is evident in everything from its influence over Hollywood, to its puppet-master relationship with the NBA, to its 480 Confucius Institutes (designated by Washington as “part of the Chinese Communist Party’s global influence and propaganda apparatus”).

As President Joe Biden concludes, China is “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

Xi is doing exactly that. But the China challenge starts inside the PRC.

Xi is pursuing what he calls the “China Dream,” which enfolds goals such as sustained economic development, military power modeled after and matching that of the U.S., ideological conformity, “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “complete unification of our country.” Making Xi’s “China Dream” come true is turning into a nightmare for his subjects.

Before leaving his State Department post, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described what Xi is doing to Uighur Muslims as “genocide,” noting that Beijing has “forced more than a million people into internment camps in the Xinjiang region” and detailing “torture, sexual abuse…rape, forced labor…and unexplained deaths in custody.” As he took the baton from Pompeo, Secretary of State Antony Blinken agreed, affirming that “The forcing of men, women and children into concentration camps, trying to, in effect, re-educate them to be adherents to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide.”

The U.S. government isn’t alone. The Uighur Muslim region, according to a UN human-rights watchdog, “resembles a massive internment camp…a no-rights zone.” More accurately, all of China is a no-rights zone.

Xi’s China is a place where Christian churches are smashed and followers of Christ are sent to reeducation camps; Buddhist temples are bulldozed; Uighur men are packed into freight trains, Uighur women are forcibly sterilized and Uighur babies are forcibly aborted; and bishops and Nobel Peace Prize laureates die in prison. Under Xi, “Religious persecution has increased…with four communities in particular experiencing a downturn in conditions—Protestant Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and both Hui and Uighur Muslims,” Freedom House reports. Amnesty International adds that “hundreds of thousands of people” are subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention in China, many of them for “peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of belief.”

There’s a brutal logic to Xi’s brutal response to religious activity. The common denominator of most every religion is that there’s something above, something beyond, something bigger, more enduring and more important than the state. That notion represents a mortal threat to the legitimacy and durability of Xi’s regime, which is founded on the premise that people exist to serve the state—not to use their God-given gifts to serve others and God.

Xi’s capacity to control is growing ever more insidious. The PRC’s new “social credit system” is using mega-databases to monitor and catalogue every aspect of life of China’s 1.3 billion people—financial transactions, civil infractions, social-media postings, online activity—and then reward or sanction Xi’s subjects by feeding all that information to the National Development and Reform Commission, banking system and judicial system. PRC subjects with good social credit scores enjoy waived fees, lower utility bills, promotions and expedited overseas-travel approval, while those with poor social credit scores can be fired from their jobs, expelled from school, blocked from universities, or barred from accessing transportation.

An Orwellian surveillance state, more than a billion people denied religious freedom and other human rights, uncounted numbers tortured in reeducation camps, physicians jailed for following the Hippocratic Oath—that’s the kind of future and the kind of world Xi wants to build. As dissident leader Xu Zhangrun observed in the wake of Beijing’s criminal mishandling of COVID-19, “A polity that is blatantly incapable of treating its own people properly can hardly be expected to treat the rest of the world well.”

NO LIMITS

That idea—the notion that the PRC is incapable of treating the world any better than it treats its own—is not particularly profound. After all, this is a regime that over the decades has erased some 35 million of its subjects and tortured millions more. Regimes like this see no limits on their power. Since they believe nothing is above the state, they rationalize everything they do in the name of the state, the revolution, the Supreme Leader, the Dear Leader, the Core Leader (Xi’s new title). With no moral constraints on what they do, they believe their ends always justify their means.

That backwards worldview informs every aspect of decision-making in the PRC. This doesn’t mean Washington should refuse to talk with Beijing. But we must be ever vigilant when dealing with Xi. A regime that can justify imprisoning, torturing and killing its own people for peacefully practicing their faith can and will justify anything: seizing foreign lands, annexing international waterways, absorbing free peoples, stealing proprietary information, leveraging a pandemic to gain geopolitical advantage, breaking treaties. The godless USSR did those sorts of things, and so has the godless PRC.

“It is difficult to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country,” President Ronald Reagan said of the USSR, “can be trusted to keep agreements with others.” And here we are yet again.

Experts in policy analysis, academia and military-security affairs conclude that Xi’s response to COVID-19 “was in breach of international law.” It pays to recall that COVID-19 was a local public-health problem that metastasized into a global pandemic due to Beijing’s incompetence or intention (either cause is reason not to entrust the future to Xi); that Xi’s regime lied about human-to-human transmission; that Xi’s regime willfully allowed millions to leave the epicenter in Wuhan for destinations around the world; that Xi’s regime carried out a premeditated plan to hoard 2.5 billion pieces of protective equipment as the virus swept the globe; that Xi’s regime blocked scientists from sharing findings about genome sequencing for weeks; that Xi’s regime continues to refuse to cooperate with international health agencies.

Xi’s intervention in Hong Kong and assertion of rule by remote-control is a brazen violation of an international treaty.

In and above the East China Sea, Beijing is constantly violating Japanese airspace and illegally loitering PRC coast guard vessels in Japanese waters. All the while, Beijing illegally claims some 90 percent of the South China Sea. Xi has backed up those claims by building 3,200 acres of illegal islands beyond PRC waters. These islands feature SAM batteries and warplanes. Xi promised the PRC wouldn’t militarize these islands. But as America and its allies learned at enormous cost last century, words don’t matter to men like Xi. Strength and the will to wield it are all that matters. Xi has both.

His goal is to control the resource-rich South and East China Seas, assert sovereignty claims in fait accompli fashion, and bring Chinese-speaking lands under his heel. Hong Kong—where only PRC-approved “patriots” are allowed to serve in government—was his first objective. Taiwan is next. Xi has made clear that democratic Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed by the communist Mainland. “We make no promise to abandon the use of force,” he warns. That explains Beijing’s ground-unit exercises, naval drills and bomber sorties around the island democracy.

Nor are Xi’s dreams and designs limited to his immediate neighborhood. Beijing is buying loyalty via development projects (see the Belt and Road Initiative), gaining a toehold in strategically located regions (see PRC control over ports in 18 countries), building an authoritarian bloc (see Russia, Serbia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela), and fielding a power-projecting military capable of challenging the Free World across every region and every domain—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Xi’s relentless cybersiege of the Free World is siphoning away inventions, discoveries, technologies and wealth, penetrating defense firms, and interfering in elections.

For those with eyes to see—who know about the laogai camps and brutalization of Muslims and oppression of Tibet and assault on Christianity—none of this comes as a surprise. What’s surprising is that for 40 years, the trade über alles caucus convinced itself that such a regime could somehow be reformed by access to Buicks and Kentucky Fried Chicken.

TAKING AIM

Xi vows to build what he calls “a more just and reasonable new world order”—one that would supplant the liberal democratic order the United States and its allies began building after World War II. Importantly, the PRC not only has the intent to build a new world order; it has the resources and capabilities to do so—which helps explain why those who designed and uphold the existing world order are answering China’s challenge.

The PRC is a country of 1.3 billion people. Its GDP is already $14.1 trillion. Its economic tendrils—trade, banking, manufacturing, logistics, shipping, technology, super-computing, artificial intelligence—stretch into every part of the globe. All of this is fueling the PRC’s relentless military modernization and buildup. The PRC’s annual military expenditure is at least $261 billion. (Beijing recently announced an increase in military spending of 6.8 percent for 2021). The PRC has a 2-million-man military, the world’s largest navy and an intense focus on its neighborhood.

None of this would be a particularly worrisome if China embraced the values of liberal democracy—the rule of law, individual freedom, religious liberty, free enterprise and free trade, majority rule with minority rights. These are the foundation stones of what Churchill and FDR envisioned when they drafted the Atlantic Charter in 1941. Their vision led to what some call the “rules-based democratic order,” others the “liberal international order,” still others the “free world order.” These terms aim to describe how the peoples of the West have tried to make the world work and indeed manage the world: They embraced and encouraged democratic governance; developed rules and norms of behavior; promoted liberal (freedom-oriented) political and economic institutions; and called upon governments to live up to the responsibilities of nationhood by respecting international borders and promoting good order within those borders. The result has been an unparalleled spread of prosperity, an unprecedented expansion of free government and an unexpected remission of great-power war (which had become an increasingly-destructive feature of the centuries leading up to 1945).

To be sure, many regimes reject the values of liberal democracy. But the PRC, like the USSR before it, not only rejects those values; it possesses the military-technological-industrial-economic assets to challenge those values, erode the liberal international order built upon those values, and forge a new international order or at least bend the existing order toward its own goals. But don’t take my word for it.

“Some seek to challenge the international order—that is, the rules, values and institutions that reduce conflict and make cooperation possible among nations,” Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warn, pointedly adding that “China in particular is all too willing to use coercion to get its way.”

Former national security advisor Gen H.R. McMaster concludes that PRC “leaders believe they have a narrow window of strategic opportunity to…revise the international order in their favor.”

Before he retired as Indo-Pacific commander ,Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Xi and his lieutenants are “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order.”

A NATO panel noted late last year that Beijing’s “approach to human rights and international law challenges the fundamental premise of a rules-based international order.”

These political, diplomatic and military leaders recognize that the liberal order has promoted the peace and prosperity of the Free World for nearly 75 years. But it doesn’t run on autopilot. If we want the benefits of a liberal order that sustains our way of life, we need to sustain the liberal order. As Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution observes, “The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.” He adds, “Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers, and every international order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests.”

Indeed, the liberal order and its guarantors have arrived at a turning point or breaking point: Either they will marshal the means and will to update, strengthen and preserve the existing order, or Beijing will dramatically transform it. Xi’s callous treatment of his own subjects and contempt for international norms offer a glimpse of what his “more reasonable new world order” would look like.

### 1NC – Cap Space Col

#### Capitalism solves extinction thru green tech innovation – gets off rock

Zimet 20 (Saul, Writer for the the Foundation for Economic Education. Capitalism or the Climate? 5-17-20. [https://quillette.com/2020/05/17/capitalism-or-the-climate /](https://quillette.com/2020/05/17/capitalism-or-the-climate%20/)/shree)

Knowledge, Deutsch argues, is the variable most relevant to our potential flourishing. When Arctic populations survive in the Arctic and Amazonian populations survive in the Amazon, they do it by means of specific knowledge. If Deutsch were suddenly transported to the primeval Great Rift Valley, he would die for lack of knowledge. Without the requisite knowledge, humans will die virtually anywhere. With the requisite knowledge, encoded in brains, genes, computers, or other substrates, humans can survive virtually anywhere, on the Earth or elsewhere in space:

Whether humans could live entirely outside the biosphere—say, on the moon—does not depend on the quirks of human biochemistry. Just as humans currently cause over a tonne of vitamin C to appear in Oxfordshire every week (from their farms and factories), so they could do the same on the moon—and the same goes for breathable air, water, and comfortable temperature and all their other parochial needs. Those needs can all be met, given the right knowledge, by transforming other resources.

Deutsch explains that even today humans possess the technology to colonize the Moon and other stereotypically harsh environments. At this time in history, colonizing the moon would be prohibitively expensive. But right now you can buy a 4-terabyte hard-drive on Amazon for under 100 dollars. In 1980, that much storage cost about 772 million dollars. The price of technology frequently undergoes enormous reductions as science moves forward. Given that the price of digital memory was divided by millions in just a few decades, imagine the extraterrestrial societies we could conceivably build after perhaps a few centuries of compounding scientific and economic growth.

However, my argument is not that we will ever colonize space, nor that we should plan to do so. As Neil deGrasse Tyson argues, it will probably be trivial to adapt to a wide range of Earth climates long before it is feasible to colonize the Moon or Mars. Rather, I am pointing out that any dependence we have on specific environmental conditions is the result of insufficient knowledge.

Capitalism and the production of knowledge

Throughout nearly all of human history, widespread economic growth per capita did not exist. Productivity per capita was ubiquitously stagnant; generation after generation, millennium after millennium, extreme poverty remained nearly universal and large-scale economic progress was not even imaginable. Virtually everyone lived on less than $3.50 per day in today’s dollars according to research from University of Oxford economist Max Roser, and the average person lived on much less. That’s even worse than it sounds, because (among other reasons) most of the things we can buy today had yet to be invented, and people didn’t have access to most of the information that informs our purchases in the 21st century.

Then, starting in Western Europe in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, an unprecedented breadth of optimism emerged and turned wealth (resources hoarded away in vaults and mattresses) into capital (resources invested in future production and discovery). Thus, capitalism was born, and with it, exponential economic growth began to spread across most of the Earth (a process that continues to this day). As a result, both the rich and the poor are consistently getting rapidly richer for the first time in human history. Whereas 94 percent of the population was in extreme poverty as recently as 1820, in 1990 the number was down to 36 percent, and in 2015 the number was less than 10 percent. And as the world gets wealthier, countless important things proliferate, such as access to nutrition, freedom from violence, improvements in life expectancy, and of course, the access to and production of scientific and technological knowledge.

Knowledge is produced and spread in many ways. Education is one crucial variable, for the purpose of having both an educated population of innovators and a thriving research community. According to research from the Brookings Institute, educational opportunities and outcomes for the affluent radically exceed those for the poor—not just between countries, or within them, but everywhere. This is to be expected. Whether funded by individuals or government programs, it costs a lot of resources to build strong educational institutions and invest in educating generations of students. Poor populations who can barely afford shelter, clean water, food, and medicine don’t have much left over to invest in less immediate necessities such as education. And of course, this creates a feedback loop with causation running in both directions—if a population is uneducated, escaping poverty is much more difficult; if a population is poor, investing in education is much more difficult.

Another foundational tool for knowledge production is innovation, which capital and profit motive facilitate. A large amount of innovation comes from excess capital being invested in new research and development. Poorer populations, whether subnational, national, or global, have less to invest in prospective new inventions and processes of which the details are unpredictable in advance. No system incentivizes useful investments and disincentivizes wasteful investments better than the capitalist system, in which the investor’s own capital is on the line. Incentives and wealth are two main reasons why all of the most innovative nations, such as the top 10 on the 2020 Bloomberg Innovation Index, are capitalist countries. The sociologist Susan Cozzens at the Georgia Institute of Technology offers a succinct description of the process:

In the classic literature of the economics of innovation, private firms are the driving force. They seek competitive advantage in the market by introducing new products that give them a temporary monopoly. By charging high prices during the period of temporary monopoly, the firm makes profits and grows. Introducing new processes can result in competitive advantage if that step reduces costs or increases productivity. In this view, firms drive innovation in order to survive and win in the marketplace.

Indeed, no serious critics of capitalism argue that any other system produces greater material wealth and innovation. Even Marxists, capitalism’s most vehement antagonists, generally acknowledge that no system has ever produced more innovation and abundance. In The Communist Manifesto in 1848, Marx and Engels wrote this:

The bourgeoisie [capitalist class], during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

If only Marx and Engels could see how drastically the affluence of the proletariat has grown under global capitalism since then.

Environmental technology

In 1894, just 21 years before Einstein’s theory of general relativity, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Albert Michelson famously proclaimed, “The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote.” Some phenomena, like blizzards and thunderstorms, are somewhat predictable to those with the requisite equipment and training. But the future of human knowledge is no such phenomenon. Discoveries, by their very nature, are unknown until they are not. Innovations are often unimaginable until they occur because the act of imagining them is what brings them into existence.

The history of failures to predict future knowledge is long and robust. In 1901, two years before they both achieved flight by aircraft, Wilbur Wright said to his brother, “Don’t think men will fly for a thousand years.” In 1932, just six years before the successful splitting of the atom, Albert Einstein said, ”There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will ever be obtainable.” In 1957, 12 years before Neil Armstrong set foot on the Moon, the father of radio Lee de Forest stated, “Man will never reach the Moon regardless of all future scientific advances.”

Even after world-changing technologies are invented, estimates of their utility are often wildly inaccurate. The Internet, cars, and telephones were all dismissed as insignificant inventions in the years preceding their universal ascendance. So we should be skeptical when we see publications like the BBC, Bloomberg, and Forbes denying the plausibility of imminent technological advances on our climate problems. The truth is nobody has any idea what salutary innovations and discoveries do or do not exist in our imminent future.

Many popular technological solutions to environmental issues have already been proposed in recent years. Carbon capture and sequestration technology is endorsed by climate scientists at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as by United States Congress members from both the Democratic and Republican parties. Inventions are being implemented to remove plastic from the oceans. Sea walls are being engineered in some coastal communities and considered at larger scales to mitigate sea level rise.

In The Climate Casino, Nordhaus writes: “Current estimates are that geoengineering would cost between one tenth and one hundredth as much as reducing CO2 emissions for an equivalent amount of cooling.” But at their present level of development, such technologies are inadequate to the full scope of the problem because they don’t sufficiently address certain dangers such as ocean acidification. Therefore, many environmentalists prefer extreme reductions in carbon emissions, which would stop anthropogenic climate change at its root. But anthropogenic climate change is not just a phenomenon of the future. The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, and other news organizations have noted that it is already having serious effects here and now. The transition from predicted impact to experienced impact took place decades ago. So, how well are we adapting so far?

Scientific American reports that global warming may already be responsible for 150,000 deaths worldwide each year due to its effects on the frequency and scale of floods and hurricanes, droughts and heat waves, spread of vector-borne diseases, and other factors. However, research from the Reason Foundation shows that deaths caused by extreme weather events have declined by more than 90 percent since 1920. University of Oxford economist Max Roser’s research shows that the burden of disease, famine, and other relevant problems have also declined in recent years and decades (the disease statistics cited above are older than the COVID-19 pandemic, but there is no evidence that COVID-19 is directly exacerbated by climate change like vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue are). And overall life expectancy has risen globally from about 34 years in 1900 to about 72 years in 2019.

Why are climate-related death rates declining overall while climate change seems to be causing more deaths? Because as economic activity continues to drive up carbon emissions, the resulting growth rates give more communities access to strongly built and climate-controlled buildings, medical education and supplies, life-saving infrastructure such as hospitals and clean water, and many other enormous advantages. When the media and activists argue that burning fossil fuels has not been worth the climate-related damage to human life, they are counting the victims of climate catastrophe while ignoring the beneficiaries of economic growth in developing countries and elsewhere. That is a mistake because the two are inextricably linked.

Choose your own extinction

Of course, just because we’ve adapted extremely well so far doesn’t mean the trend will continue. Dangerous tipping points may yet accelerate the problem beyond our capacity to respond. As living organisms, we have a problem of evolutionary magnitude: we adapt gradually in an environment that can change rapidly. If we go on existing like any other animal, our niche will eventually change so quickly that we won’t be able to adapt fast enough. This has happened to 99.9 percent of all known species since the beginning of life on Earth roughly four billion years ago. These changes have ranged from asteroid impacts, to volcanic eruptions, to viral pandemics, and of course to human activity in recent millennia, and are typically unpredictable to the species they eliminate because they come from outside the limited context in which those species evolved.

Some argue that humans are just another mammal like any other, and that all our claims of exceptionality have been ignorant hubris. If this is true, we are almost certainly doomed to relatively imminent extinction by forces beyond our influence. But thinking this way about the human species does not quite account for the implications of the economic growth trend of the last few centuries. In his book Scale, former Santa Fe Institute president Geoffrey West, whose renowned scientific research put him on Time Magazine’s 2006 list of the 100 most influential people in the world, discusses a profound biological fact about mammal species: they virtually all have the same average number of heartbeats per capita. An average elephant has a long lifespan but a slow heart-rate, and an average mouse has a short lifespan but a fast heart-rate. It all balances out to roughly one-and-a-half billion heartbeats over the course of a lifetime. Other classes of animals follow similar metabolic scaling laws.

A few hundred years ago, before the rise of capitalism, humans were no different—they lived roughly 35 years on average and had about one-and-a-half billion heartbeats just like any other mammal. But gains in knowledge since then, such as innovations in medicine, agriculture, and government, have roughly doubled our life expectancy and with it our average number of heartbeats per lifetime (some dogs and other domesticated animals have been similarly altered by access to human innovations). This constitutes a totally unprecedented departure from the biological status quo.

Technological knowledge, fueled by capital, has allowed us to do many things categorically unlike the achievements of other species as far as we know. The universal extinction paradigm, which has limited all mammal species so far to one million years or less, should be high on our list of patterns to break. We don’t know what existential threats will come or how long we have to prepare for them, but we can’t expect human ingenuity to rush us past the finish line at the last minute without a context of widespread continuous technological and scientific progress until that point—a project it seems only capitalism can hope to fund.

David Deutsch observes that the word “sustain” generally refers to the absence or prevention of change. This is what environmentalists such as Naomi Klein and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez would like to do with our environment by ending capitalism. Their solution to climate change is what all non-human animals have always done: leave the environment basically unaltered by refraining from large-scale production, and wait around to go extinct. Unfortunately, as Deutsch writes, “Static societies eventually fail because their characteristic inability to create knowledge rapidly must eventually turn some problem into a catastrophe.” Thus, it is not that capitalism is the problem and sustainability is the solution, but that sustainability is the problem and capitalism is the solution.

Every year, global capitalism allows more research and development departments to be funded. Every day it gives more citizens of affluent and developing nations the material wealth required for better education and information technology. Economic growth, coupled with rising carbon emissions, might lead to a climate apocalypse—or it might continue to bring us material and technological salvation. We cannot really know in advance. But we would be crazy to choose the time-tested alternative to capitalism: extinction by stagnation.

### 1NC – Cap Renewables

#### Regrowth is inevitable, but they doom renewables

Damir Tokic, 12, ((Damir, PhD in international finance, professor of finance @ University of Monaco. "The economic and financial dimensions of degrowth," Ecological Economics. Volume 84, December 2012, Pages 49–56. Science Daily.)

Following (or ideally during) the economic implosion (which happens quickly), we would logically expect a fiscal and monetary policy intervention as explained by Bernanke (2002). As a result, assuming that Bernanke is correct, the extraordinary monetary policy intervention would eventually create positive inflation and stabilize the economy and asset prices. Consequently, given pent-up consumer demand during the crisis and the lean inventories following the deflationary “scare”, we would expect a new long-term cycle of positive economic growth to resume. Thus, our key argument is that a gradual long-term negative GDP growth (as illustrated in Fig. 1) is unsustainable and not possible to achieve in a market economy. Rather, we argue that it is more likely that the economy would quickly adjust to long term negative GDP growth expectations, or implode, which would be followed by another long-term growth cycle, given the policy intervention during the implosion. In a broader sense, it is unlikely that even ecological concerns can be addressed by degrowth as illustrated in Fig. 1. First, the environmental issues would be less important during the economic implosion, which could delay the development of sustainable alternative energy. Second, while the environmental picture could temporarily improve during the economic implosion, the carrying capacity will eventually be exceeded yet again as the economic growth resumes, as we illustrate in Fig. 2. Third, given that crude oil is an investable asset, it is likely that the price of crude oil would correct during the implosion due to deleveraging, deflation, and the decrease in demand for energy, which are likely to be only temporarily positive for ecological concerns. However, the temporary lower crude oil prices would also put climate change issues on the backburner, and thus, limit the interest in development of alternative energy projects. Thus, in the long run, the economic implosion would be a net negative for ecological concerns. As soon as the economy rebounds, energy consumption growth would resume and eventually exceed the carrying capacity, this time perhaps even more damaging for the environment due to the significantly delayed development of effective alternative energy sources. To summarize our key argument, O'Neill (2012) illustrates degrowth in Fig. 1 as a sustainable transition phase, or a process, during which the size of the economy gradually declines to an environmentally sustainable level over a long period of time. However, our analysis suggests that the degrowth scenario would cause a shock to the overall economy. Thus, the degrowth phase would be very short and implosive, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We base our argument on the prediction that the stock market would crash if faced by a degrowth economic forecast, which would cause more deleveraging and reinforce the vicious cycle of deflation. Further, O'Neill (2012) suggests that the degrowth phase is likely to be followed by the SSE or a flat GDP growth within the environmental limits (Fig. 1). We suggest that the economic implosion caused by the degrowth scenario is likely to be followed by a new cycle of economic growth, which would eventually reach and exceed the environmental limits (Fig. 2). Thus, our key suggestion is that degrowth is unsustainable as an explicit economic policy.

#### Unchecked climate change causes extinction.

Bill McKibben 19. Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College; fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; holds honorary degrees from 18 colleges and universities; Foreign Policy named him to their inaugural list of the world’s 100 most important global thinkers. "This Is How Human Extinction Could Play Out." Rolling Stone. 4-9-2019. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/bill-mckibben-falter-climate-change-817310/

Oh, it could get very bad.

In 2015, a study in the Journal of Mathematical Biology pointed out that if the world’s oceans kept warming, by 2100 they might become hot enough to “stop oxygen production by phyto-plankton by disrupting the process of photosynthesis.” Given that two-thirds of the Earth’s oxygen comes from phytoplankton, that would “likely result in the mass mortality of animals and humans.”

A year later, above the Arctic Circle, in Siberia, a heat wave thawed a reindeer carcass that had been trapped in the permafrost. The exposed body released anthrax into nearby water and soil, infecting two thousand reindeer grazing nearby, and they in turn infected some humans; a twelve-year-old boy died. As it turns out, permafrost is a “very good preserver of microbes and viruses, because it is cold, there is no oxygen, and it is dark” — scientists have managed to revive an eight-million-year-old bacterium they found beneath the surface of a glacier. Researchers believe there are fragments of the Spanish flu virus, smallpox, and bubonic plague buried in Siberia and Alaska.

Or consider this: as ice sheets melt, they take weight off land, and that can trigger earthquakes — seismic activity is already increasing in Greenland and Alaska. Meanwhile, the added weight of the new seawater starts to bend the Earth’s crust. “That will give you a massive increase in volcanic activity. It’ll activate faults to create earthquakes, submarine landslides, tsunamis, the whole lot,” explained the director of University College London’s Hazard Centre. Such a landslide happened in Scandinavia about eight thousand years ago, as the last Ice Age retreated and a Kentucky-size section of Norway’s continental shelf gave way, “plummeting down to the abyssal plain and creating a series of titanic waves that roared forth with a vengeance,” wiping all signs of life from coastal Norway to Greenland and “drowning the Wales-sized landmass that once connected Britain to the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany.” When the waves hit the Shetlands, they were sixty-five feet high.

There’s even this: if we keep raising carbon dioxide levels, we may not be able to think straight anymore. At a thousand parts per million (which is within the realm of possibility for 2100), human cognitive ability falls 21 percent. “The largest effects were seen for Crisis Response, Information Usage, and Strategy,” a Harvard study reported, which is too bad, as those skills are what we seem to need most.

I could, in other words, do my best to scare you silly. I’m not opposed on principle — changing something as fundamental as the composition of the atmosphere, and hence the heat balance of the planet, is certain to trigger all manner of horror, and we shouldn’t shy away from it. The dramatic uncertainty that lies ahead may be the most frightening development of all; the physical world is going from backdrop to foreground. (It’s like the contrast between politics in the old days, when you could forget about Washington for weeks at a time, and politics in the Trump era, when the president is always jumping out from behind a tree to yell at you.)

But let’s try to occupy ourselves with the most likely scenarios, because they are more than disturbing enough. Long before we get to tidal waves or smallpox, long before we choke to death or stop thinking clearly, we will need to concentrate on the most mundane and basic facts: everyone needs to eat every day, and an awful lot of us live near the ocean.

FOOD SUPPLY first. We’ve had an amazing run since the end of World War II, with crop yields growing fast enough to keep ahead of a fast-rising population. It’s come at great human cost — displaced peasant farmers fill many of the planet’s vast slums — but in terms of sheer volume, the Green Revolution’s fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery managed to push output sharply upward. That climb, however, now seems to be running into the brute facts of heat and drought. There are studies to demonstrate the dire effects of warming on coffee, cacao, chickpeas, and champagne, but it is cereals that we really need to worry about, given that they supply most of the planet’s calories: corn, wheat, and rice all evolved as crops in the climate of the last ten thousand years, and though plant breeders can change them, there are limits to those changes. You can move a person from Hanoi to Edmonton, and she might decide to open a Vietnamese restaurant. But if you move a rice plant, it will die.

A 2017 study in Australia, home to some of the world’s highest-tech farming, found that “wheat productivity has flatlined as a direct result of climate change.” After tripling between 1900 and 1990, wheat yields had stagnated since, as temperatures increased a degree and rainfall declined by nearly a third. “The chance of that just being variable climate without the underlying factor [of climate change] is less than one in a hundred billion,” the researchers said, and it meant that despite all the expensive new technology farmers kept introducing, “they have succeeded only in standing still, not in moving forward.” Assuming the same trends continued, yields would actually start to decline inside of two decades, they reported. In June 2018, researchers found that a two-degree Celsius rise in temperature — which, recall, is what the Paris accords are now aiming for — could cut U.S. corn yields by 18 percent. A four-degree increase — which is where our current trajectory will take us — would cut the crop almost in half. The United States is the world’s largest producer of corn, which in turn is the planet’s most widely grown crop.

Corn is vulnerable because even a week of high temperatures at the key moment can keep it from fertilizing. (“You only get one chance to pollinate a quadrillion kernels of corn,” the head of a commodity consulting firm explained.) But even the hardiest crops are susceptible. Sorghum, for instance, which is a staple for half a billion humans, is particularly hardy in dry conditions because it has big, fibrous roots that reach far down into the earth. Even it has limits, though, and they are being reached. Thirty years of data from the American Midwest show that heat waves affect the “vapor pressure deficit,” the difference between the water vapor in the sorghum leaf’s interior and that in the surrounding air. Hotter weather means the sorghum releases more moisture into the atmosphere. Warm the planet’s temperature by two degrees Celsius — which is, again, now the world’s goal — and sorghum yields drop 17 percent. Warm it five degrees Celsius (nine degrees Fahrenheit), and yields drop almost 60 percent.

It’s hard to imagine a topic duller than sorghum yields. It’s the precise opposite of clickbait. But people have to eat; in the human game, the single most important question is probably “What’s for dinner?” And when the answer is “Not much,” things deteriorate fast. In 2010 a severe heat wave hit Russia, and it wrecked the grain harvest, which led the Kremlin to ban exports. The global price of wheat spiked, and that helped trigger the Arab Spring — Egypt at the time was the largest wheat importer on the planet. That experience set academics and insurers to work gaming out what the next food shock might look like. In 2017 one team imagined a vigorous El Niño, with the attendant floods and droughts — for a season, in their scenario, corn and soy yields declined by 10 percent, and wheat and rice by 7 percent. The result was chaos: “quadrupled commodity prices, civil unrest, significant negative humanitarian consequences . . . Food riots break out in urban areas across the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. The euro weakens and the main European stock markets lose ten percent.”

At about the same time, a team of British researchers released a study demonstrating that even if you can grow plenty of food, the transportation system that distributes it runs through just fourteen major choke-points, and those are vulnerable to — you guessed it — massive disruption from climate change. For instance, U.S. rivers and canals carry a third of the world’s corn and soy, and they’ve been frequently shut down or crimped by flooding and drought in recent years. Brazil accounts for 17 percent of the world’s grain exports, but heavy rainfall in 2017 stranded three thousand trucks. “It’s the glide path to a perfect storm,” said one of the report’s authors.

Five weeks after that, another report raised an even deeper question. What if you can figure out how to grow plenty of food, and you can figure out how to guarantee its distribution, but the food itself has lost much of its value? The paper, in the journal Environmental Research, said that rising carbon dioxide levels, by speeding plant growth, seem to have reduced the amount of protein in basic staple crops, a finding so startling that, for many years, agronomists had overlooked hints that it was happening. But it seems to be true: when researchers grow grain at the carbon dioxide levels we expect for later this century, they find that minerals such as calcium and iron drop by 8 percent, and protein by about the same amount. In the developing world, where people rely on plants for their protein, that means huge reductions in nutrition: India alone could lose 5 percent of the protein in its total diet, putting 53 million people at new risk for protein deficiency. The loss of zinc, essential for maternal and infant health, could endanger 138 million people around the world. In 2018, rice researchers found “significantly less protein” when they grew eighteen varieties of rice in high–carbon dioxide test plots. “The idea that food became less nutritious was a surprise,” said one researcher. “It’s not intuitive. But I think we should continue to expect surprises. We are completely altering the biophysical conditions that underpin our food system.” And not just ours. People don’t depend on goldenrod, for instance, but bees do. When scientists looked at samples of goldenrod in the Smithsonian that dated back to 1842, they found that the protein content of its pollen had “declined by a third since the industrial revolution — and the change closely tracks with the rise in carbon dioxide.”

Bees help crops, obviously, so that’s scary news. But in August 2018, a massive new study found something just as frightening: crop pests were thriving in the new heat. “It gets better and better for them,” said one University of Colorado researcher. Even if we hit the UN target of limiting temperature rise to two degrees Celsius, pests should cut wheat yields by 46 percent, corn by 31 percent, and rice by 19 percent. “Warmer temperatures accelerate the metabolism of insect pests like aphids and corn borers at a predictable rate,” the researchers found. “That makes them hungrier[,] and warmer temperatures also speed up their reproduction.” Even fossilized plants from fifty million years ago make the point: “Plant damage from insects correlated with rising and falling temperatures, reaching a maximum during the warmest periods.”

### 1NC – Cap Solves War

#### Capitalism solves war on a massive scale – it creates lock-in mechanisms that bind countries together and economically dampens conflict – robust studies

Dafoe 14 (Allan Dafoe & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions.

### MMT

#### Debt concerns key to prevent economic crises and rampant inflation --- all empirics are on our side.

Daniel LACALLE 17. Professor of Global Economy and Financial Analyst, Instituto de Empresa. *Escape from the Central Bank Trap*. Business Expert Press. Kindle Book. Chapter 3.

The Disaster of “People’s QE” and Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)

The apparent failure of expansive monetary policies created a “new” school. I say new with irony because it is the oldest school in history, to create money out of nothing to finance “the people.” And “the people” being, of course, the government.

It is called the modern monetary theory but it is just the same thing that has been done many times in history from the French Assignats, to the policies of Allende in Chile,30 Kicillof in Argentina,31 or Maduro in Venezuela.32 And with the same results—massive inflation, destruction of currencies, then blaming “speculators” for the stagflation, and finally, bankruptcy.

Because there is nothing “social” about mass inflationary policies. From Allende to Kirchner and Maduro, printing and inflating is not a social policy; it is theft.

The indiscriminate creation of money not supported by savings is always behind the greatest crises, and there is always someone willing to justify it as both a problem and its solution.

We must understand what money is and why “creating it” artificially without support destroys more than it apparently improves.

Money is a means of exchange and payment that must be widely accepted. If citizens lose confidence in its value due to manipulation, it disappears as a means of exchange, a store of value, and unit of account. That confidence is not dictated by a committee or a government by decree.

Money in its function as a means of exchange facilitates trade, preventing barter. When its value is questioned, when it loses its place as a reserve, the economy is destroyed, going from crisis to crisis, which are becoming faster and more violent.33

There are very evident examples of currency crisis generated by reckless increase in money supply with no respect for the warning signs of inflation and devaluation. Maduro’s Venezuela (Figure 2.3), Zimbabwe (see Figure 2.2), Kirchner’s Argentina, the Assignats disaster in the French revolution, the Weimar Republic—all those examples generated mass poverty, scarcity, out of control inflation, and widespread loss of confidence in the currency.

Inflation is always a monetary effect. It is the symptom of a clear imbalance.

Money Versus Inflation

Money, when created from the expansion of artificial credit is also destroyed—a serious financial crisis, defaults, falling real assets—based on unjustified expectations.

Whether that artificial money creation is through credit to governments, people, or companies, the outcome is the same. The distortion generated by inefficient allocation of capital has the same effect.

Modern monetary policy advocates using the expansion of the central banks’ balance sheet for helicopter money, that is, to give newly created money directly to the people—and for financing government spending. It is the same mistake as QE but it shifts the imbalance from financial markets to the average citizen.

It sounds promising. The central bank “creates” new money and gives it to every citizen, so they can spend. This boosts consumption and improves the economy. Except, it doesn’t. The currency devalues and imports, goods, and services become more expensive. The economy does not receive the boost that the media and inflationist economists estimate because the negative effect of rising prices lowers the assumed impact on consumption and also because some citizens will decide to save that money. Even in contained environments like the cities in Europe that have created local currencies to boost regional consumption, there is no evidence of any improvement in either the economy or its ability to endure crises.34

Consider the example of Argentina, which has seen an inflation of 350 percent since 2008 from what the government called an “inclusive” policy of creating money to pay “employment and public investment,” increasing money supply by 30 percent per year.

But the desire to think that making money out of nothing “creates wealth” and has no consequences is simply a pseudo-religious prejudice, not a reality. An analysis of the creation of money and inflation shows that the effect is evident and that it always ends with a financial crisis, higher inflation, and greater unemployment. The “placebo effect,” the illusion of growth that is created short-term, erupts with a major crisis in a short period of time.

What the socialist inflationists of the MMT school forget is the effect of saturation of debt and the impact of the continuous creation of money on money velocity, which measures the economic activity.

Creating money to subsidize hypertrophied states or to perpetuate the misallocation of capital of private agents are the same. An additional unit of indebtedness does not generate enough nominal GDP growth to reduce debt accumulation, even if the stock is monetized; it fuels the next shock with greater virulence.

The relationship between money creation and inflation since 1960 is direct as can be seen in “Inflation versus M2 Money Supply from 1960.”35 See Figure 2.4 with more recent data.

The saturation effect and the manipulation of capital allocation in the economy favoring specific sectors designated by the government plunge economic activity, as financial repression and the tax burden on families and companies increase. Input costs soar, tax burden increases, expansion cycles are shorter, and margins are weaker.

But the theory is based on the idea that if “the government spends, economic activity increases and there is a multiplier effect.” Public spending multiplier has been proven to be inexistent, even negative, in many studies. In the experience of more than 44 countries it is shown that the multiplier effect is nonexistent in open and highly indebted economies.36

The accumulated deficit means higher taxes later. Consumer preferences, given financial repression, do not improve because the government spends. Government spending only generates more overcapacity and consumers spend less knowing taxes will rise. The new monetarists forget that their recommendation is precisely what led Brazil and China to industrial overcapacity of 27 percent and 38 percent respectively.37 And these are not populations with demographic problems.

Growth is not poor due to lack of public spending, which, globally, is at its highest in 50 years. It is poor because of the attack on the consumer through taxes38 to pay for said expense and the assault on the saver through financial repression by means of devaluation and lowering of rates.

Other examples of the disaster that “creating money for the people” were seen in Chile with Allende, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela. The perpetrators of this disaster always call it “economic warfare”—accusing businessmen or speculators of the consequences of monetary irresponsibility.

To flood the public sector with “new” money without any sterilization,39 monetizing everything, which is called “Popular QE,” is the same madness and has the same effects.

It assumes that the central bank loses its already-questioned independence and directly becomes a government agency that prints money when the government wants, but that increase of money supply does not become part of the transmission mechanism that reaches all parts of the economy; the new money is only for the government to finance a “Public Investment Bank.”

The mistake of the socialist monetarists of the popular QE is that their theory starts from the correct argument that monetary expansion as we know it today does not work. However, instead of understanding that printing currency is simply an unjust transfer of wealth from savers to the inefficient and the indebted, they do not see monetary expansion as the problem, but the distribution mechanism. So, they want to avoid any transmission mechanism and create money directly for governments.

The first problem is obvious. The central bank would create money without any backing, which is the equivalent of a bank lending without any assets. And that money would be used for white elephants—massive public spend projects without any evident economic return because if there was one it would have been invested in the past. The public investment bank would provide unlimited funding, generating elevated risks of irresponsibility in spending. And it is an obvious displacement of incentives to waste money. But it would also generate disproportionate negative effects on the private sector as unfair competition would mean that the only sectors that would survive would be the ones attached to governments (what we know as cronyism).

The second problem is that this public bank’s mounting nonperforming loans from lending to projects without profitability will be covered with taxes to citizens and the private sector.

The third problem is that inflation created by these projects is a burden on the disposable income and purchasing power of the citizen who does not benefit from this expansion of “unlimited” spending. Taxes rise, cost of living soars and, above all, a large part of the business fabric gets destroyed, because the government has unlimited privileged credit. To think that this inflation leads to higher salaries is a fallacy that is demonstrated by history. It has always proven that real wages fall to historic lows.

This policy, as we have said, has been implemented many times in the past, and every time with disastrous consequences. It is the model that sank the French revolution with the Assignats40 and the Argentina of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her minister Axel Kicillof.41 It is a model that has only created massive inflation and recession, or, stagflation.

To think that the government can decide the amount of money it needs and spend it on what it wants without dramatic negative consequences is simply science fiction.

Aristocrats of public spending, who have never created a company or hired anyone with their savings and effort, always think that intervening in the creation of money and in the economy will save everything.

Do they know? Of course, they do. They do not care, because for them the State is infallible and the objective of political dominance of the economy excuses every other mistake. “Socialism has a history of failures so brutal that only a group of pseudo-intellectuals can ignore it and say that they will make it different.”42

Increasing money supply more than the historical growth of nominal GDP always creates huge imbalances that leads to a great crisis.

The MMT is not new. It is the same old search for unlimited economic government control at all costs financed at the expense of all others.

### AT: Financialization – 1NC

#### Financial reforms insulate the potential collapse of the financial sector from the rest of the economy.

Michael S. Barr 17. Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. “Financial Reform: Making the System Safer and Fairer” University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. 1-2017. https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1909/

Overview of Reforms

In the United States, passage of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) ushered in comprehensive reform in key areas: enlarging the regulatory perimeter by creating the authority to regulate financial firms that pose a threat to financial stability, without regard to their corporate form; enacting a resolution authority to deal with the potential collapse of these major firms in the event of a crisis, without feeding a panic or putting taxpayers on the hook; attacking regulatory arbitrage, restricting risky activities, and beefing up banking supervision; requiring central clearing and exchange trading of standardized derivatives, and capital, margin and transparency throughout the market; improving investor protections; and establishing a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to look out for the interests of American households.

Today, major financial firms are subject to higher prudential standards, including higher capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests, and resolution planning through “living wills.” By forcing firms to internalize more of the costs that they impose on the system, they will be incentivized to shrink and reduce their complexity, leverage, and interconnections. Should such a firm fail, there will be a bigger capital buffer to absorb losses. To stem a panic, the Dodd-Frank Act permits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve the largest and most interconnected financial companies without exposing the system to a sudden, disorderly failure that puts the economy at risk.

On the global level, the international community has put forward new rules on capital, so that there are bigger buffers in the system in the event of failures. Capital will be measured in a more conservative way, and capital levels are going up significantly. Systemically important firms will hold even higher levels of capital. There are new rules on liquidity and a global leverage limit. Derivatives reforms are proceeding, as are new approaches to dealing with the risks from repo and securities financing transactions.

Yet much more work remains to be done, and the financial sector did not leave the battlefield after their defeats in 2010. Far from it. The brutal fight over financial reform rages on, and there is serious risk that a collective amnesia about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis appears to be descending on global financial capitals that will further weaken the resolve for reform (See, for example, Coffee 2011, 2012).

Comparing U.S. Financial Regulation Pre-­Crisis and Post-Reform

Many readers may be skeptical regarding the efficacy of the reforms that have taken place thus far, either because they think they did not change the system enough, or because they think that they went too far. The following section takes the time to chart the path of reform so far, before turning to the difficulties and dangers on the road ahead.

First, before Dodd-Frank, if an entity was a bank, it had tougher regulations, more stringent capital requirements, and more robust supervision; but if an entity was an investment bank engaged in the same kind of maturity transformation, it had to abide by different rules (see Scott 2010). When U.S. investment banks needed to find a “consolidated holding company regulator” in order to meet European Union standards for doing business in Europe, the Securities and Exchange Commission set up a voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity program which had little oversight. The SEC was not established as a prudential regulator, did not have clear supervisory power, and had little experience and few trained examiners. Moreover, the leverage ratio that served as a backstop for bank capital requirements was not applied to investment banks.

The Federal Reserve was too lax in supervising firms where it did have authority and it did not have any authority to set and enforce capital requirements on the major institutions that operated businesses outside of bank holding companies. That meant it had no supervision over investment banks, diversified financial institutions such as AIG, or the nonbank financial companies competing with banks in the mortgage, consumer credit, and business lending markets. The Office of Thrift Supervision viewed its role as supervising thrifts, not their holding companies (such as AIG). Banks and thrifts freely engaged in risky mortgage lending, and regulators did not step in until it was too late.

Today, Dodd-Frank has provided authority for clear, strong and consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve of any financial firm—regardless of legal form— whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability. The largest investment banks that survived the financial crisis merged into or became bank holding companies subject to Fed oversight. AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and MetLife have now been brought under Fed supervision through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designation. As a result of Dodd-Frank changes, thrift holding companies (including those with large insurance operations) are now supervised by the Fed. The Office of Thrift Supervision and the SEC’s investment bank regime have been abolished. Thus, all bank and thrift holding companies, as well as systemically important nonbank firms, regardless of corporate form, are supervised by the Federal Reserve. We will have a single point of accountability for tougher and more consistent supervision of the largest and most interconnected financial firms.

Although the regulatory infrastructure is, to put it mildly, far from ideal, with too many divided responsibilities and too many opportunities for turf battles or regulatory gaps, DoddFrank created the FSOC, which is responsible for identifying threats to financial stability and dealing with them. The FSOC can recommend stricter regulatory action, and regulators must either implement such changes or explain publicly why they are not acting (see Gerson 2013). Already, this process has led the SEC to impose stricter regulation of money market funds than would otherwise have occurred (Barr 2015a). The FSOC has the potential to get information across the financial services marketplace through the Office of Financial Research (OFR), which Dodd-Frank established and empowered to collect data from any financial firm, and to develop and enforce standardization for data collection. The OFR has begun to use this authority by developing a “legal entity identi fier” for financial transactions. The OFR is charged with independently assessing risks in the financial system, and can potentially serve as a counterweight to the Fed by providing independent assessments of whether the Fed is adequately supervising the largest firms and dealing with the critical issues in systemic risk. A strong OFR can serve as a check and balance for regulatory agencies, ensuring that they improve their own performance or risk being criticized (Ludwig 2012; Barr 2015a).

Dodd-Frank provides for more stringent prudential standards and higher capital and liquidity standards for the largest bank and nonbank firms. In addition to the heightened capital requirements applicable to all firms, the largest firms are subject to a capital surcharge, a leverage ratio, a toughened supplemental leverage ratio, a more stringent liquidity requirement, and capital required to pass stress tests.

Already, capital levels in the banking system have doubled, and banks’ use of short-term nondeposit funding has plummeted. The annual stress tests are evaluating a firm’s ability to withstand deep market contractions. There are enhanced rules on affiliate transactions and lending limits, and much stricter proposed limits on counterparty credit exposures. Deposit insurance premiums are going up on the very largest firms. The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain proprietary trading or running internal hedge funds, subject to a number of exceptions, and also helps to simplify the task of winding down major firms that are at risk of failure. Moreover, the Fed is using macro-prudential supervision as it increases its capacity to understand and mitigate risks to the financial system as a whole.

There is a healthy debate about breaking up or limiting the size of financial firms. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, major firms are subject to a concentration limit that generally prohibits a financial company from engaging in mergers or acquisitions that would result in the firm’s liabilities—including wholesale funding and off-balance sheet exposures—exceeding 10 percent of the liabilities of financial companies as a whole. Dodd-Frank provides regulators with the authority to require financial institutions to restructure their activities to make it credible that they can be resolved if they are in danger of collapse; the resolution planning process has already forced firms to begin to simplify their organization form, develop “clean” holding companies, and place large amounts of capital and long-term debt in the holding company to assist with the resolution. The act also permits regulators to force firms to be broken up if they fail to submit a credible plan and thereafter fail to meet regulators’ requirements to restructure themselves to make resolution credible. Such firms can also be broken up if they are found to pose a grave threat to financial stability. These enhanced prudential measures for major financial firms are likely to reduce risk in the financial system, constrain further concentration, and reduce “too big to fail” distortions.

Second, before Dodd-Frank, shadow banking markets grew dramatically with little oversight and in the absence of even regulatory or marketwide knowledge about the nature of the markets they were serving. For example, the OTC derivatives market—with a notional amount of $700 trillion at its peak—grew up in the shadows, with little oversight. Credit derivatives, which were supposed to diffuse risk, instead concentrated it. Synthetic securitization with embedded derivatives magnified failures in the real securitization market. Major financial firms used derivatives to increase their credit exposure to each other, rather than decrease it.

We should never again face a situation— such as AIG’s $2 trillion derivatives portfolio— where the potential failure of a virtually unregulated, capital-deficient major player in the derivatives market can impose devastating risks on the entire system. Insufficient capital meant that major participants in the system could not reliably pay out on their obligations, and insufficient margin meant that counterparties on every transaction were more exposed to the risk of nonpayment. When the crisis began, regulators, financial firms, and investors had an insufficient understanding of the degree to which trouble at one firm spelled trouble for another, because of the opacity of the market. This lack of information magnified the contagion as the crisis intensified, causing a damaging wave of margin increases, deleveraging, and credit market breakdowns. Lack of transparency, insufficient supervision, and inadequate capital and margin left our financial system vulnerable to concentrations of risk, and to abuse.

### Bio-Power

#### Biopower is inevitable and it’s use is good---their critique allows the private sector to assert a more destructive form of control.

Stan Luger and Brian Waddell, 2017. \*\*Professor and Chair of political science, University of Northern Colorado. \*\*Associate Professor of political science, University of Connecticut. *What American Government Does*. John Hopkins University Press. 362-71.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT has become very controversial in the United States. Many Americans misunderstand what government does generally and underappreciate the specific role that government plays in guaranteeing America's success as a nation. The US government has improved the lives of Americans in numerous ways. It provides income, food, education, housing, and health care supports for many, not just those in poverty. It ensures cleaner air, water, and food. It supplies the vast infrastructure (roads, bridges, sewage systems, etc.) on which economic growth depends. The government has stabilized the economic system through these activities and others, including the government's bailout of the largest banks and other institutions responsible for the 2008 economic meltdown. Without government action, that economic crisis would have led the world economy into a total collapse.

The government also engages in activities that trouble many Americans, including domestic surveillance and repression and the monitoring and control of behavior considered to be immoral. The government's national security policies have also spun out of democratic control on many occasions, leading the nation into unwanted and costly wars and interventions. What the government does, then, is a complex mix of activities that includes many things that Americans support wholeheartedly, and others that elicit concern and criticism. This has been one of our main points in this book. It is distracting and confusing to paint with a broad brush when speaking of "the government."

The Anti-Government Movement

Still, many conservative commentators and politicians promote simplistic, anti-government attitudes, seeking to pit American citizens against their government-over which they still have many types of democratic checks- while remaining silent about growing private, corporate power. There has been a long-standing anti-government strain to American culture that has been easily manipulated into blaming government for many of the ills affecting the nation today. Americans actually embrace collectivist responses to the many problems they have faced over the course of the twentieth century and be"' [END PAGE 362] yond, accepting the often generous government contributions to their own success, while at the same time believing in a libertarian individualism that assumes people are solely responsible for their fates, good or bad. Americans are thus vulnerable to simplistic arguments about their government, and easily distracted from the larger issues of power this book has raised.

Americans should be vigilant about possible abuses in the exercise of power. Differentiating among the government's many functions allows a clearer focus for such concerns, since not all government powers potentially directly threaten citizens. In addition, we have noted that concerns about the exercise of power should include both government and the business system, that is, both public and private power. The exercise of power is necessary and unavoidable in complex societies. Power is exercised in the public sector by government officials, and in the private sector by corporate executives. It is simply not true that only government exercises power. Nor is it true that the "free" market constitutes an arena free of power.

One difference between the two forms of power is that public power is more visible, acknowledged, and easily criticized, as we can see in the strong criticisms of governmental power prevalent today. This difference is understandable, to an extent, since government can more directly interfere with one's freedom. Still, for many, a person's life opportunities, and the greater part of an individual's working life, are controlled by business enterprises that are not directly accountable to the larger public. The irony in this hyperawareness of governmental power and lesser concern for private corporate power is that a key attribute of public power is its potential responsiveness and accountability to democratic majorities.

The exercise of public, governmental power is more scrutinized, and it is acceptable and expected that we criticize government, therefore making it more accountable. Governmental power is also just as necessary to our nation's success as is the economic system. It is not simply some contingent institutional force that can be done away with, in a spasm of anti-government rage. Both the government and the economic system are inexorably connected in such a way that each is dependent on the other, in necessary and unavoidable ways, for the other's achievements. There is no free market system without the use of government power. The so-called free market is simply not a freestanding entity, as many would have it.

This book, by detailing what the government actually does, has been geared to laying the groundwork for a healthier debate about the role of government in our lives. Everyone likes some parts of what government does while disliking other parts. But many politicians today have been selling a fantasy that government represents the main problem that stands in the way of greater happiness for most Americans, and that therefore we must reduce the role of [END PAGE 363] government to some bare minimum, or even eradicate it altogether. As Grover Norquist says: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." 1 Such a flippant statement may simply seem to be hyperbole, but we must remember the amount of influence Norquist has in the Republican Party today. Jeb Bush was the only 2016 Republican presidential candidate not to have signed Norquist's Taxpayer Protection Pledge, which obligates the signer to resist and vote against any and all tax increases.

Nearly 1,400 elected officials have signed the pledge, including essentially the entire Republican congressional delegation.2 The antitax message is one of the most powerful trends in our current politics. It blames government for all our troubles and, as such, seeks to "starve the beast" so government cannot fulfill its functions capably any longer. Tax cuts are most often directed at the very wealthy, who thereby gain both more wealth and more political clout. First, this allows them to invest their savings in the rising amount of government debt (needed to replace the revenues lost to tax cuts), transforming these individuals' tax liabilities (income on which they otherwise would have to pay taxes) into an investment in government bonds, securities, and the like that pay them dividends. As Wolfgang Streeck discerns, "Not only is state poverty the investors' wealth; it offers them a golden outlet to invest their wealth profitably." Second, as major funders of the fiscal instruments that underwrite the government's debt, they become an important constituency of the modern state. In the eyes of government officials, the wealthy minority competes with and even shoulders aside popular majorities. As the government's debt accumulates, the creditors' claims on government officials often trump those of common citizens, magnifying what scholars see as the growing tensions between capitalism and democracy. As Streeck concludes: "The state as debt state serves to perpetuate [and deepen] patterns of social stratification and the social inequality built into them. At the same time, it subjects itself and its activity to the control of creditors in the shape of 'markets.' " 3

Reductions in taxes deepen the amount of government debt and increase the leverage of the wealthy over any nation's politics. Such tax cuts also straightjacket government, reducing its ability to deliver the expected goods to popular majorities. Moreover, hikes in taxes and fees paid by the working classes are used to make up for tax reductions on the wealthy. Therefore, the more many Americans pay, the less they seem to get in return, fueling their increasing distrust and disgruntlement about the role of government in their lives.

As a result of this process, anti-government voices have become the loudest and most prevalent ones in our politics, so much so that it has become difficult for many Americans to have a rational and coherent understanding of how necessary and significant the government is to our nation's success. This book [END PAGE 364] has been about providing some of the tools, understanding, and historical knowledge for interested citizens to gain a clearer sense of what their government actually does, in order to combat the simplistic thinking that has come to dominate political debates. The need for such knowledge is manifest, especially at this point in our nation's history, when recent polls have demonstrated that the public's trust in government is at historic lows.

These polls, however, show something very different from a knee-jerk dislike of government. When asked about specifics, large majorities of Americans have positive views about much of what the government does, including ensuring that foods and medicines are safe, dealing with natural disasters, setting rules for workplace safety, preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the environment, ensuring access to health care and education, maintaining infrastructure, and strengthening the economy. Of the thirteen major government functions listed in the polls, Americans gave high marks to ten of them. And even the low marks involved Americans believing that more should be done with regard to ensuring a basic income for the elderly and helping people get out of poverty. Concerns about managing the immigration system received the lowest marks.4

Any government is multifaceted, engaging in many diverse and even contradictory functions. As a result, it is difficult to generalize when we speak of what the government does. It does many things, and, in this book, we have attempted to come to grips with the most significant functions of the US government. It is essentially meaningless to pronounce blanket statements about "the government," or "what the government does." We can only know our own government, or any government, through an understanding of its specific functions. The polls cited above demonstrate that Americans appreciate many of government's distinct functions, approving much of what the US government does, while retaining a generalized distrust of "the government" writ large. 5

### AT: Liberal War

#### No liberal war---their work is based on an interpretive disposition of suspicion, not empirics.

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Genealogy, biopolitics, and the liberal peace

In the lecture series immediately following Security, Territory, Population, namely The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault (2008) more narrowly focused on the shift from classically liberal to neoliberal forms of government emerging in the 1930s and growing in the 1950s, and how neoliberal governmentality worked by shaping subjectivity according to neoliberal economic imperatives (Foucault, 2008). Foucault’s preoccupation with biopolitics, understood as a general shift in modern liberal rule away from territory to population and life, has also inspired a number of IR scholars. Michael Dillon, Julian Reid, and Brad Evans, for instance, have examined the violent propensities inherent in liberalism, committed to a global war in the name of life itself (e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2009; Evans, 2010, 2011; Reid, 2006). Genealogy, understood as a form of critique played less of a role in the writings of Dillon and Reid, in part perhaps since Foucault was only one of many sources of inspiration for their writings. In Evans’ more programmatic writings on Foucault and liberal war, however, the genealogical commitments reminiscent of the first generation of post-structuralists clearly surface. In laying out the “liberal war thesis,” Evans explains,

Norms as such appear to be the logical outcome of reasoned political settlement. Our discourse of battle, however, appreciates that power defines the norm such that those who deviate from it pose a threat to the biological heritage of life. The norm is another way of suppressing political differences. There are then no universal, all-embracing, value-neutral, timeless, or eternal a priori norms that inhibit some purified and objective existential space where they await access by the learned justices of the peace. There is no absolute convergence point to human reason. Every norm is simply the outcome of a particular power struggle. (Evans, 2011: 751, and see Evans, 2010: 424)

A similar imagery is found in Vivienne Jabri’s (2010) biopolitical critique of the liberal peace project, which draws out the genealogical critique to issues of vital significance in IR, in particular the possibility of establishing a lasting global peace underpinned by international institutions, law, and norms. Since Jabri forcefully draws out the empirical implications of the genealogical disposition, her text warrants a closer examination.1 The liberal peace project, as is well known in IR, aims at promoting basic liberal values, such as the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of democratic institutions worldwide. Jabri locates the origins of the renewed interventionist thought in former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace from 1992, when absolute sovereignty was put into question following the end of the Cold War. To use Hedley Bull’s (1977) famous categories, the principle of Order understood as the unconditional upholding of the principle of sovereignty hence disallowing any (military) intervention, came to be challenged in the name of Justice, understood as a global project of making the world a somewhat better place. State sovereignty became increasingly conditional on the state’s ability to uphold basic human rights. Not only did liberals in IR perceive of the end of the Cold War as providing an opportunity for a global restructuring of relations between states (e.g. Kegley, 1993), in which such a tilt from Order to Justice would be possible, so did Frankfurt school oriented critical IR (e.g. Booth, 1991). Jabri then, uncontroversially, regards the 1990s discourse on humanitarian intervention, and the follow-up UN initiative from 2005 of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as important articulations of the liberal peace project.

Jabri’s (2010) genealogical critique of the liberal peace project starts from “the premise that to intervene at all in other societies is by definition colonial, suggestive of dispossession, racialised domination, and subjugation” (2010: 42). Thus, whether intervention takes the form of conducting air strikes or the sending of “armies” of advisors on how institutions best can uphold the rule of law, all forms of intervention is by definition illegitimate, since “the other” is deemed as irrevocably other and different from the “Western liberal self,” whose capacity for self-determination should not be violated. What Jabri wants to cast into doubt is the self-understanding of the liberal peace project as one of “rescue,” “care,” and “protection” that denies the “violence” inherent in the liberal peace project (2010: 42, 48). Jabri repudiates this benevolent understanding and instead proposes that the liberal peace project is “a project of war” which is primarily and ultimately driven by a biopolitical desire to manage populations. At the end of the day, Jabri asserts, the liberal peace project amounts to little more than a continuation of Western imperialism, thus a war against the other, fought in the name of humanity, and like the colonial European project aiming at the “management of populations through governmentality” (2010: 53, 54). To that end, the liberal project employs the twin pillars of, on the one hand, “military and carceral power” in the form of various police missions, and, on the other hand, “pedagogical power” as other forms of aid in constructing democratic institutions (2010: 54). Both forms of exercise of power though, partake in Euro-Western neo-colonialism.

In support of her thesis of the liberal peace project as one of war, Jabri’s argument rests on two particularizing moves with clear genealogical underpinnings. First, “the state” that the liberal peace project wishes to strengthen is seen as a Euro-Western way of organizing political life, ill-suited and alien to non-Western localities, and is thus to be understood as an imposition. Second and more importantly, “the human” which the liberal peace project seeks to protect is but one rendition of what the human may mean and ultimately resting upon a Kantian notion of “the autonomous rational individual” originating in the European Enlightenment (2010: 45). “The human” that the liberal peace project seeks to protect, Jabri notes, is not understood as “an empty space,” which can be endlessly filled with various articulations, but as an autonomous decision-maker, precisely the subject protected and thus conjured up in discourses of human rights (2010: 47). The force that is used in the liberal peace project (and any intervention in its name) is thus premised on a particular understanding of the human. Jabri contrasts this “rational subject” to a cultural subject; the “cultural” as she uses it then stands in for that which is beyond the grasp of Western liberal reason (2010: 47). She further notes that “the epistemological and ontological underpinning of the liberal peace project is precisely based upon a rationalist construction that is universal in its articulation” and “aims to shape societies so that they become self-governing entities within distinctly liberal lines” (2010: 47, 48). So, her main criticism is that the liberal peace project is premised upon and thereby constitutive of a particular subjectivity, namely the European liberal self, that now seeks to universalize itself. The liberal peace project places this subject in a position of hierarchy over non-liberal conceptions of self and society, and imposes it upon other localities from “the outside” (2010: 55). In so doing, it disallows other articulations of subjectivity and is hence understood as a form of violence even if not undertaken by military means.

The kernel of critique in the arguments examined ranging from the first generation post-structuralists to the later generation of Foucauldian scholars inspired by governmentality and biopolitics lies in the assumption that an alleged universal is nothing but a particular in disguise, which has forgotten, repressed, or refused its particularity, and in the claim to being or representing the universal does violence to various others. The assumption of conflicting particularities, which is pre-methodological and not inductively derived from the empirical work itself, is reflective of the ontological assumptions of genealogy conceived as a form of critique. To better understand what is at stake in making this assumption and ultimately being able to assume a critical distance to it, we need to turn to Foucault’s genealogical phase, which immediately preceded his writings on governmentality and biopolitics.

Foucault, genealogy, and critique

It should from the outset be clarified that my object of interrogation is not Foucault’s oeuvre as a whole but rather narrowly his genealogical phase, from his Nietzsche, Genealogy, History which appeared in print in 1971, until his lecture course “Society Must Be Defended” in 1975–1976. Some interpreters of Foucault have suggested that he abandoned the genealogical stance, in part due to the problems that I will raise here (e.g. Dean, 2010: 58; Lemke, 2012: 11–12). Mitchell Dean (2010), for instance, noticed that Foucault’s genealogical project of thinking social relations in the vocabulary of war, violence, and battle “found itself uncomfortably close to a position that tended to identify all forms of power with domination.” (2010: 58). No doubt, after “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault’s vocabulary changed from war, combat, and violence, to governance, governmentality, and conduct (Walters, 2012: 16). Foucault may in fact never fully have embraced the genealogical disposition himself. The critique that I advance is therefore not necessarily aimed at Foucault himself. Moreover, I shall not venture into the difficult debate on the extent to which Foucault was finally able to keep relations of power, violence, and domination analytically apart, but simply note that such questions were pressing concerns until the very end of his life (for a critical view, see Hanssen, 2000: 148–157). In what follows, I reconstruct the genealogical disposition, which Foucault elaborated in close dialogue with Nietzsche.

In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault offers a reading of Nietzsche’s genealogy, while also laying bare his own philosophical commitments. The importance of the piece can hardly be exaggerated for understanding Foucault’s project (cf. Rabinow, 1984: 76). These commitments were to guide the only full-fledged genealogical work Foucault wrote, Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995 [1975]) as well as his second genealogical work, the first part of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1990 [1976]). To reiterate, genealogy appears less as a method in the sense of a set of rules that the researcher applies onto a historical material, but more as an ethos, a certain critical disposition. To begin with, genealogy opposes itself to the search for origins, since such a search “assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession” (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 78). In other words, the genealogist, along with Nietzsche, rejects substance ontology, where entities exist as already fully formed self-identical, monads. Instead he or she embraces an ontology of forces in perpetual movement and becoming without a telos (Schrift, 1996). Whereas a traditional historian seeks to trace “the beginning,” understood as uncovering some pure state of things, the genealogist, on the other hand, finds only “the dissension of other things” and “disparity” (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 79). In this context, the genealogist will seek to “cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other” (1984 [1971]: 80). Thus, the genealogist subscribes to what Milbank refers to as a differential ontology where all identities are to be methodically disaggregated to demonstrate the estranged nature of identity (Milbank, 2006: 278–326). As Foucault (1984 [1971]) summarizes such a commitment, “history will not discover a forgotten identity, eager to be reborn, but a complex system of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered by the powers of synthesis” (1984 [1971]: 94).

Furthermore, the genealogist refuses to see historical would be identities as teleologically predetermined. He or she instead discovers that “truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (1984 [1971]: 81). The genealogist therefore does not treat emergence as a surface manifestation of a deep principle or essence realizing itself in history as coming into being where the endpoint of the movement is already immanent to the event itself. Contrasting the teleological disposition to the genealogical, Foucault (1984 [1971]) writes that whereas the former “would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises [the latter] seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of domination” (1984 [1971]: 83). Thus, the genealogist refuses the Aristotelian binary of essence and accident, in which a deep essence gradually comes to the surface, and if it is not doing so, it is due to contingent accidents, a theoretical figure which informs both liberal progressivism and Marxism. And history, in the genealogist’s understanding, is not the sum total of teleological or dialectical movements in which elements or forces are being reconciled. This would presuppose a principle of unity or intelligibility outside and beyond itself, which time makes present onto itself. To sum up, instead of reading history as progressive shifts according to a profound logic where the essence or telos of history realizes itself in surface manifestations that the philosopher deciphers, for the genealogist there is literally nothing “underneath” or “beyond” the contingent play of forces (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 104–118).

Drawing on Nietzsche’s notion of active and reactive forces, Foucault (1984 [1971]) understands emergence as “the entry of forces,” comprehended as a clash and confrontation between forces, which “do not belong to a common space” (1984 [1971]: 84–85). Thus, “in a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this ‘non-place’, the endlessly repeated play of dominations” (1984 [1971]:85). How are we then to understand the emergence of this space of “non-place”? Such a space does not exist prior to the clash of forces; it is rather the battle itself which clears and opens it, and indeed the battle perpetually enacts a movement of clearing such a space (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 109). However, the relationship between forces is not a real “relationship”—since the forces have nothing in common—only an endless clash. And the place where this encounter occurs is not really a “place” at all, but an “inaccessible, impalpable, yet enabling non space.” The domination is therefore manifested throughout all of history “in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations” on some over others (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 85; Hanssen, 2000: 46). This primordial endless clash of forces where “the strong” dominates “the weak” in a myriad of configurations provides the following rendition in which this relationship of domination, “makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it” (1984 [1971]: 85).

The clash of forces that constitutes this perpetual battle, it should be emphasized, is not a surface phenomenon which masks a deeper reality: it is literally all there is. Thus, at the beginning of every spatiotemporal order lies domination upheld by violence. This clash gives rise to the emergence of a “structured field of forces,” in which the battle continues in the rituals of power, inscribed in codes of conduct, in norms, values, traditions, and laws (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 110). The law and the norm that are presented as domesticating struggle and redressing injustices, are nothing more than temporary inscriptions of a relationship of domination. It should finally be made clear that power-as-forces stand in hierarchical relations of domination. After temporary ruptures in the structure of dominations, new structures of dominations emerge. A balance-of-power type of rough equilibrium between forces will not last (Hanssen, 2000: 97–157; and see Coole, 2000: 119–121).

In Truth and Juridical Forms, a lecture series given in Rio in May 1973, Foucault returns to Nietzsche when further elaborating on the possibilities of writing a historical rather than philosophical understanding of the subject. He emphasizes the radical break enacted between the activity of knowing and the supposed object of that knowledge. Instead of being a relation in which knowledge, so to speak, hooks onto the world, “[k]nowledge must struggle against a world without order, without connectedness, without form, without beauty, without wisdom, without harmony, and without law.” The relation between knowledge and the world to be known may “only be a relation of violence, domination, power, and force, a relation of violation” (Foucault, 2003 [1973]: 9). Foucault credits Nietzsche for breaking with the previously assumed harmonious relationship between knowledge and world, in which God ultimately stands as the underwriter of such as relation. Western philosophy, Foucault asserts, from Plato through Descartes and culminating in Kant, has always “characterized knowledge … by resemblance, by congruence, by bliss, by unity” (2003 [1973]: 12). This assumption of thinking in terms of “congruence, love, unity, and pacification” in fact makes the philosopher the person who is most likely to get things wrong since “[o]ne can understand what knowledge consists of only by examining these relations of struggle and power, the manner in which things and men hate one another, fight one another, and try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations over one another” (2003 [1973]: 12). The philosopher’s categories of unity, correspondence, truth, reason, and love only work to obscure the endless violent impositions of power-as-forces.

The genealogical ethos, as so far presented, occupies a central but ambiguous position in Foucault’s later work. On the one hand, the genealogical ethos is precisely what remains when his historicism is shed. In that sense, it seems entirely justified to describe it as an ontology (Oksala, 2012: 18–19). On the other hand, to talk about a Foucauldian ontology may appear self-contradictory since Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) seeks to thoroughly historicize ontology and comes very close to a complete embrace of historicism (2003 [1975–1976]: 172–173). Foucault’s differential ontology of struggle, conflict, and violence must itself, in accordance with the historicist displacement of ontology, have a history. Ontology, on Foucault’s genealogical understanding, can, as Johanna Oksala notes (2012), be nothing but “a politics which has forgotten itself,” since every order is nothing but a temporary stabilization of clashing power-as-forces (2012: 35).

In his lecture course at Collège de France in 1975–1976, “Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault traces the contingent emergence of the genealogical ethos which enables him to undertake such a genealogy in the first place. In the course of the lecture series, Foucault expands on the genealogical ethos, delineated in Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History, and Truth and Juridical Forms, by historically tracing the emergence of the conditions that make such an understanding of history possible. Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) devotes the majority of his lectures to tracing the emergence of a hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that, inverting Clausewitz’s famous dictum, politics is the continuation of war with other means (2003 [1975–1976]: 15). This is indeed the logical conclusion of the genealogical ethos that he, up to this point, only established “philosophically” through Nietzsche. This hypothesis, which he appropriately refers to as “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” entails that “[i]f we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority, beneath the claim order of subordinations, beneath the State and State apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?” (2003 [1975–1976]: 46–47). It is, throughout the lecture series, made clear that this is a discourse with which he sympathizes a great deal (e.g. 2003 [1975–1976]: 65, 111, 173; and see Hoffman, 2007: 769–771).

There is, as Johanna Oksala (2012) writes in her recent book on Foucault and violence, often a conflation of ontological or “symbolic” violence and physical violence. She argues that even if we embrace the coding of knowledge and representation of the world in terms of violence and imposition—due to a fundamental disharmony between knowledge and being—this does not necessarily lead to the embrace of the ineradicability of physical violence. She writes that “the investigation of the constitutive role of physical violence must be thoroughly historical and must not rely on any ontologized notion of originary violence as such,” thus seeking to sever the link between the two (Oksala, 2012: 37). But if we accept violence as ontologically inscribed, we might also expect physical violence to follow suit, and the distinction becomes merely one of quantity rather than quality. Hanssen (2000) makes this point when she writes,

[g]ranted in Deleuzean style, Foucault adopted a nonphysical conception of force, which referred to a differential process of “evenementality” rather than advocating real, naturalistic combat … the problem still remained that Foucault did glean the differential play of forces and politics of difference from the real bloody tussle of armed struggle. (2000: 137)

Quite clearly, the distinction between ontological and physical violence cannot be so easily upheld. In the genealogical Foucault, the basic problem is his insistence on the tendency of wills to power always to turn into relations of violent domination.

Genealogy and the hermeneutics of baseless suspicion

How may we then understand the suspicion to anything common, shared, and universal that genealogy is closely linked to and that we find in IR scholarship informed by genealogy? To be able to assume a critical distance from genealogy as a form of critique, it is important to realize that the genealogical ontology of violence is but one option, no more and no less grounded than ontologies which refuse violence as foundational. In this penultimate section, I unravel the Nietzschean backdrop to Foucault’s genealogy and briefly contrast the genealogical ontology of violence with one which refuses violence as foundational by turning to the work of John Milbank.

Paul Ricoeur (1970) once referred to Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the “masters of suspicion.” Instead of taking surface phenomena such as discourse, culture, or subjective experience at face value, the “masters of suspicion” sought an underlying phenomenon which would in turn situate and explain this discourse, culture, or experience. For Marx, the ideas, values, and culture of a society would of course ultimately be “conditioned” by the economic base, and at the end of the day shown to be working toward perpetuating the interests of a particular class. For Freud, various types of behavioral neurosis could be explained by reference to an underlying repressed unconscious, which the psychoanalyst would help “bring to the surface,” and make the patient aware of, in the process of psychoanalysis. Nietzsche, however, became for Foucault in his genealogical phase, as Milbank (2006) puts it, “the only true master of suspicion” (2006: 278). Nietzsche’s suspicion, which Foucault takes over and expands on, lies in that all truth claims can be unmasked and exposed as nothing but manifestations of underlying wills to power. Foucault rejects the metaphoric of surface/depth, since the clash of wills to power goes on in the everyday activities of life. There is no deep structure “beyond” or “behind” this clash. However, in another sense, there is still a surface/depth binary at work, which harks back to Foucault’s Nietzschean understanding of a primordial clash in the “non-place” of emergence of forces. As Foucault puts it in a Zarathustra-like pronouncement, commenting on his affinities with the other French neo-Nietzscheans Deleuze, Lyotard, and Guattari, “I would say that we try to bring to light what has remained until now the most hidden, the most occulted, the most deeply invested experience in the history of our culture—power relations.” The “hidden truth” which Foucault (2003 [1973]) wants to “bring to light” is precisely that power relations “permeate the whole fabric of our existence” (2003 [1973]: 17).

The genealogist thus cultivates a particular interpretive disposition to the world, well summed up by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983):

[h]aving destroyed ideal significations and original truths, [the genealogist] looks for the play of wills. Subjection, domination, and combat are found everywhere he looks. Whenever he hears talk of meaning and value, of virtue and goodness, he looks for strategies of domination. (1983: 109)

“The political question,” as Foucault (2003 [1973]) puts it, before asserting “the importance of Nietzsche,” is not about “error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself” (2003 [1973]: 75). But a number of problems with this view of politics as conflict always tending to violence and domination as foundational to the human condition immediately present themselves. When all gestures to what is common have been exposed as expressions of partial wills to power, and when the ethos of baseless suspicion has been unleashed and revealed all ideals, values, laws, and norms, as partial and biased, does that mean that human life has become more truthful, as arriving at the realization of the “reality” of this ontologized state of primordial clashes? On Foucault’s own ontology, “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” would itself have to be unmasked as yet another contender among many to capture the final truth about the human condition, and shown to mask a partial will to power (Milbank, 2006: 282; Oksala, 2012: 27). If one deploys the genealogical suspicion onto the genealogical disposition itself, it is revealed as but one option among others.

Reading the genealogical ethos as expressing a distinctive (anti)theological core, one may, with Milbank (2006), ask whether the Nietzschean suspicion that Foucault takes over “is the final and truly non-metaphysical mode of secular reason, or else itself embodies an ontology of power and conflict which is simply another mythos” (2006: 2). One may also follow Milbank in his suggestion that secular discourse of which he reads post-Nietzschean genealogy as a radical exponent of emerged out of an active rejection of some of Christianity’s core teachings. Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) articulates this rejection when he refers to genealogy as

the very opposite of those traditional analyses that try to find beneath the apparent or superficial confusion, beneath the visible brutality and passions, a basic rationality which is both permanent and related, by its very essence, to the just and the good. (2003 [1975–1976]: 269)

However, in classical Thomist Christianity, difference does not have to be suppressed, reduced, or subsumed in any kind of dialectical movement. Thus, in contrast to Foucault’s genealogy, “[p]eace no longer depends upon the reduction to the self-identical, but is the sociality of harmonious difference. Violence, by contrast, is always a secondary willed intrusion upon this possible infinite order” (Milbank, 2006: 6).

Once one realizes that the ontology of violence is no more than one possible mythos, one can put forward “an alternative mythos, equally unfounded, but nonetheless embodying an ‘ontology of peace’, which conceives differences as analogically related, rather than equivocally at variance” (Milbank, 2006: 279). On the one hand, the reading that Milbank proposes affirms what we find in genealogy, namely “the reduction of substance to transition.” On the other hand, such a reading “questions the transcendental reading of transition as conflict” (Milbank, 2006: 298). So while Milbank retains a differential ontology, he questions whether the elements would have to relate to one another arbitrarily and violently. Milbank puts the crux of the issue thus,

The question of the possibility of living together in mutual agreement, and the question of whether there can be a charitable act, […] turn out to be conjointly the question of whether there can be an “analogy” or a “common measure” between differences which does not reduce differences to mere instances of a common essence or genus. In other words a likeness that only maintains itself through the differences, and not despite nor in addition to them. (Milbank, 2006: 290)

The point is not necessarily that IR scholarship should embrace Milbank’s alternative vision, but rather to make clear that the genealogical rendition is but one option, no more and no less grounded than ontologies which refuse violence as foundational.

Conclusion

This article has examined genealogy as a form of critique in IR. The first part of the article demonstrated that Foucault’s genealogy was an important component in the work of the first generation of post-structuralist IR as well as in contemporary scholarship informed by frameworks of governmentality and biopolitics. It was shown that when genealogy is understood as critique, violence risks being inscribed as foundational to global political life. However, despite the fact that it is virtually impossible to understand the meaning of “critical” in this work without a grasp of genealogy, the assumptions of genealogy have been insufficiently engaged. To rectify this, the second part of the article critically examined the philosophical underpinnings of genealogy. Through a close reading of three core texts where Foucault grapples with genealogy, it was shown that genealogy relies on an ontology of forces, which are postulated as arbitrarily and violently related. Genealogy therefore tends to inscribe violence as foundational to social relations. It was further noted that genealogically informed critique brings a peculiar form of suspicion to all that is presented as common, shared, and universal. This suspicion was traced back to Nietzsche and characterized as “baseless,” which again reflects a set of particular ontological commitments idiosyncratic to genealogy. These commitments, which inscribe violence as foundational, were finally contrasted to an ontology which follows the genealogical understanding of emergent forces, but refuses the assumption of them as arbitrarily and violently related.

Finally, what are the implications for empirical Foucauldian work for the argument I have pursued in the article? In empirical work informed by governmentality and biopolitics, IR scholars often examine the encounter between Western and non-Western countries. The problem to which I ultimately want to draw attention is not that such scholarship is often critical of military intervention undertaken by Western powers. On the contrary, it is important to bring out and critically scrutinize the paternalistic and indeed hierarchical renditions that no doubt are common in, for instance, the liberal peace project (e.g. Richmond, 2011). The problem is rather that the genealogical ethos risks turning into a global interpretive disposition, with which all global interactions by whatever means are made a priori suspect. Instead of seeking to engage in a careful empirical consideration of the merits of forms of intervention in each case, the generalized genealogical suspicion disables any other understanding of global political life than a ceaseless unfolding drama of clashing wills to dominate and conquer. Since the liberal project is exposed as just a particular will to power, it must inscribe a relation of violent hierarchy to non-Western localities, as opposed to an understanding of similar and harmoniously overlapping subjectivities already existing in those places. On such a pre-methodological genealogical disposition, intervention becomes suspicious in whatever form it may take. Whether it is in the form of peacekeeping troops or rule of law advisors assisting local actors in security sector reform, any involvement can only be read as a manifestation of “the West’s” ongoing will to colonize and impose its will on others.

The genealogical disposition easily lends itself to an assertion of incommensurability, more often than not coded in terms of “culture,” since the clashing wills to power in Foucault’s ontology of emergence do not belong to a common space; they have nothing in common. What is made suspect to the extent of disabled is genuine social learning through communication, which presupposes that different sociocultural settings may display profound similarities of aspirations of what is desired. For instance, holding out the possibility that whatever goes under the label of human rights, and especially its minimalist rendition of what human means, is compatible with a range of walks and ways, may harmoniously blend with, and may resonate with many traditions around the world is perhaps the ultimate hope on which the liberal peace project rests (e.g. Moyn, 2010). This hope, however, is disabled by a peculiar form of genealogical faith which lures the researcher to interpret all human interaction as disguising a ceaseless and primordial clash of wills to power.

Following the argument pursued in this article, one needs to realize that the genealogical disposition is reflective of certain ontological assumptions which are but one option. Empirical work in IR informed by governmentality frameworks is no doubt valuable in that such work opens up for a much more extensive power analysis than approaches that reify state actors as the only relevant actors in global politics. Moreover, Foucault’s writings on biopolitics have served as a starting point for examining what happens when life rather than territory become the object of rule, thus broadening the traditional focus in IR to include geopolitics and biopolitics (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2015). However, when conducting empirical work in such traditions, it is important to refrain from reading an ontology of violence into the empirical analyses, or at the very least, reflect on the ethico-political stakes involved in doing so.

### AT: Pos Peace

#### Over-expanding the definition of peace sacrifices the analytical clarity necessary to formulate effective solutions and authorizes violence to eliminate structural problems

George H. Quester 89, chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, ANNALS, AAPSS, 504, July

A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al- ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op- position to violence must include an opposition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any or- ganizational or power relationships that vi- olate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some- how simultaneously, rather than being con- tent with a "negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that con- sciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important. as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of poverty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to-one link in causal relationships and if motivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictatorship and poverty is to weaken our motivation or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possible then to define violent attacks as peaceful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and violence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less duplicitous level, we simply have some need- less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people.

### Growth

#### Growth is good---it’s positively correlated with welfare and degrowth can’t actualize the transition in time.

Kelsey Piper 21. Staff Writer for Vox's new vertical with a focus on the global poor, animal welfare, and risks affecting a stable future for our world. "Can we save the planet by shrinking the economy?" Vox. 8-3-2021. https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/future-perfect/22408556/save-planet-shrink-economy-degrowth

\*Charts in the original article omitted

There’s a lot of speculation here, and a lot of what degrowth’s critics would call hand-waving. Degrowth is fundamentally premised on the claim that we can cease to focus on growth while getting better than ever at addressing human needs. If that’s true, then that would certainly be great news.

But in many ways, it’s a vision more wildly optimistic — disconnected from actual policy results — than any of the more standard “sustainable development” models degrowthers criticize for being out of touch.

First, in the world today, there’s an extremely strong association between growth and welfare outcomes of every kind. GDP, while imperfect, is a better predictor of a country’s welfare state, outcomes for poor citizens in that country, and well-being measures like leisure time and life expectancy than any other measure.

“GDP does leave out non-commercialized activities that are welfare-enhancing,” economist Branko Milanovic writes in a rebuttal of degrowth:

It is, like every other measure, imperfect and one-dimensional. But ... it is imperfect at the edges while fairly accurate overall. Richer countries are countries that are generally better-off in almost all metrics, from education, life expectancy, child mortality to women’s employment etc. Not only that: richer people are also on average healthier, better educated, and happier. Income indeed buys you health and happiness. (It does not guarantee that you are a better person; but that’s a different topic.) The metric of income or GDP is strongly associated with positive outcomes, whether we compare countries to each other, or people (within a country) to each other.

The things degrowthers care about — leisure time, health care, life expectancy — are strongly correlated with societal wealth. The generosity of a welfare state and the availability of transfers to a state’s poorest people are also strongly correlated with societal wealth. Innovation, discovery, invention, and medical technology improvements are also strongly correlated with societal wealth.

[Chart omitted]

The strong correlation between child mortality and GDP per capita is apparent on the above graph. There are some outliers — some countries outperform or underperform their GDP somewhat, in terms of preventing child deaths — but in general, wealth strongly predicts child survival. No single, simple medical intervention causes the difference. Wealthier societies on average get better health outcomes across the board.

[Chart omitted]

This graph looks at child mortality not just by comparing rich countries to poor ones but also by comparing countries over time, as they get richer: Getting richer improves outcomes for children.

[Chart omitted]

Leisure time, too, has increased — and hours worked have declined — as the world has gotten wealthier.

It might be possible in principle to do better — to decouple, if you will, health and well-being from access to material resources, so that everyone is well-off with many fewer resources.

But the examples degrowthers point to remain speculative ones; if we ought to be skeptical, as degrowthers argue we should be, about the decoupling of wealth from ecological impact, we ought to be at least as skeptical about the prospects of decoupling wealth from living standards.

“In the end, economic growth is about the production of stuff that people need and then the consumption of those things by the people who need it,” Max Roser at Our World in Data, a research institute focused on finding, visualizing, and communicating historical economic and health data, told me. He added:

The money aspect, and the abstract concept of GDP, distract us and make it less obvious what it’s actually about. People want to have enough food, they need to go to the doctor, they need childcare, they want a good education. People need lots of stuff, and one thing that people care about are goods and services, and they need to be produced, and economic growth is about an increase in the quality and quantity of the goods and services that people need.

There’s also the knotty problem of who gets to decide which goods and services people choose to spend their money on. Many of the climate scientists I spoke to shared Hickel’s impatience for many specific carbon-intensive modern industries. “I’m not going to defend bitcoin,” the Breakthrough Institute’s Hausfather told me. (The cryptocurrency has attracted intense criticism for being astoundingly carbon-intensive.)

But there is a lot in between bitcoin and basic subsistence needs. And “enough for everyone who needs it” inherently requires value judgments about what people really need, and what things they value that are frivolous luxuries. That’s why so many anti-poverty programs have moved away from giving people “what they need” toward just giving them cash — that is, giving them wealth, which they can choose to spend however they please.

“Even poor people have so many needs for goods and services that you can’t possibly put them on a list and say, ‘Now we’re done here,’” Roser told me. “That’s the beauty of money, that you can just go out there and get what you need rather than what some researcher determines are your needs.”

Degrowth is unrealistic — and gaining traction

As a policy program, degrowth suffers from being both too radical and not radical enough.

There’s a lot of broad-brush policy prescriptions in the degrowth lit, but those details never really add up.

While it’s not a short book, Less Is More feels surprisingly sparse when it comes to envisioning how the changes it recommends could be brought about. The chapter on solutions recommends cutting the workweek and changing tax policy — two solid proposals — but then rounds that out by recommending ending technological obsolescence, advertising, food waste, and student debt.

I’m not particularly opposed to those policies. But they seem laughably inadequate for the magnitude of the task at hand: confronting the climate crisis. Degrowth successfully persuades that guiding humanity and our planet through the 21st century will be really, really hard — but not in a way degrowth particularly solves.

Where degrowth literature is relentlessly pessimistic about the prospect of our problems being solved under our current economic system, it turns oddly optimistic about the prospect that they’ll be solved once we embrace a different way of viewing wealth and progress. If cutting carbon emissions fast enough to matter requires shrinking the global economy by 0.5 percent a year indefinitely, starting right now, as the Nature paper estimates, that’ll take policy measures much larger and more ambitious than any proposed in Less Is More.

“If we are to avert catastrophic warming, we have to lower carbon emissions by a factor of two within the next 10 years. I find it highly implausible that capitalism/market economics will be abandoned by the world on that time frame,” Pennsylvania State University climatologist Michael Mann told me. “That means we have to act on the climate crisis within the framework of the current system.”

### 1NC – Cap Solves Disease

#### Capitalism is key to fight disease---incentives to innovate solve COVID, Ebola, HIV, and Zika.

Allysia Finley 21. Allysia Finley is a member of the Journal's Editorial Board. Ms. Finley joined The Wall Street Journal in 2009 after graduating from Stanford University with a bachelor’s degree in American Studies. During college, she edited the opinions section for The Stanford Review and wrote columns for The Orange County Register. "Capitalism Is What Will Defeat Covid." WSJ. 3-19-2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/capitalism-is-what-will-defeat-covid-11616192690

Behold the paradox of this pandemic moment: Large corporations are political villains, derided on the left and right. Yet the main, and perhaps only, reason the Covid-19 scourge is easing is vaccines developed by Big Pharma.

Few are more acutely aware of this paradox than Alex Gorsky, CEO of [Johnson & Johnson](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/JNJ), the healthcare device, pharmaceutical and consumer-goods company best known for products like Band-Aids and Tylenol. Politicians have vilified his industry over prescription-drug prices, and trial lawyers for using talc in its baby powder, which it discontinued in North America in 2020. But now J&J is a household name in the best way for developing its single-shot Covid vaccine, which the Food and Drug Administration approved for emergency use last month. The vaccine is increasing the U.S. supply of shots at a critical time and will enable a billion people world-wide to be vaccinated this year.

J&J’s road to the vaccine—from failure to life-saving success, from investment write-off to breakthrough—is a little-known story about science, business risk and innovation. There are also lessons for those who think capitalism is merely about rapacious profit.

“We would never be in the position where we are today if we had not invested billions of dollars over decades so that we could respond,” Mr. Gorsky, 60, says in an interview the Monday morning after the FDA authorized its Covid vaccine. The U.S. Army veteran had been up since 3:30 a.m., getting in one of his early-morning workouts before meetings. J&J’s Covid-19 vaccine development over the last year has been a sprint, but the process that led to it has been a decades-long marathon.

Vaccines such as those for polio, MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) and seasonal flu have been made from weakened or inactivated viruses. But patients often produce a weak immune response to the inactivated viruses, and shots that use weakened viruses can make immunocompromised people sick. The manufacturing process is also laborious.

Scientists over the past couple of decades have been studying a potentially more efficient and effective method known as a “vector vaccine”: using genetically engineered viruses to prime the immune system by delivering parts of a pathogen’s genetic code into human cells. Our cell machinery then manufacturers the dopplegangers. The harmless look-alikes trigger an immune reaction, marshaling antibodies and white blood cells. When the real pathogen invades, the immune system is prepared.

“Your body has multiple layers of response in these situations. There’s the immediate response, and there’s the longer term response,” Mr. Gorsky says. “Your body recognizes the virus and begins producing antibodies, as well as T-cell and B-cell response.”

B-cells produce antibodies that act like sentinels and prevent infection. T-cells provide backup if a virus penetrates the antibodies’ frontline defense and help enlist white blood cells into action. Antibodies can fade after a few months, but T-cells stick around longer and have something of a photographic memory. Some people who were infected with SARS in 2002-04 were found to have T-cells that remembered the virus a decade later.

J&J’s vaccine was found to be 72% effective at preventing moderate to severe Covid symptoms (meaning two or more symptoms that don’t require hospitalization) in U.S. trials. That’s less than the 95% of the Moderna and [Pfizer](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/PFE) -BioNTech vaccines, which received emergency-use authorization earlier, and which are followed by a booster a few weeks after the initial shot. But the trials aren’t directly comparable. For one thing, J&J’s trial occurred later, in the fall and early winter, when more virus variants were circulating. Some variants with changes to their spike protein, which helps the virus infiltrate human cells, appear to partly elude the antibody response.

T-cells aren’t as easily tricked. One reason scientists are excited about J&J’s vaccine is that its one shot induces a robust T-cell response. This means immunity is likely to last longer—how long remains to be seen—and less likely to be defeated by new variants.

Mr. Gorsky attributes the strong multilayered immune response from J&J’s vaccine to its innovative adenovirus-vector platform, AdVac, which it has developed over a decade.

Adenoviruses like those that can cause the common cold—so named because they were first isolated in human adenoids—are easy to manipulate because they have a large genome. They also don’t integrate their genes into our own. This makes them an ideal tool for vector-vaccines. The problem is that many people have pre-existing antibodies to adenoviruses from prior infections, so their immune systems may try to shoot down the vaccine as if it were a cold.

In 2007 a promising Merck HIV vaccine, which used the adenovirus-5, or Ad5, failed to prevent infection in the later stages of a clinical trial. Worse, data indicated that people who tested positive for Ad5 antibodies were more susceptible to HIV infection than people who received a placebo, a phenomenon known as vaccine-induced enhancement. A 2008 article in the Journal of Experimental Medicine was titled “The failed HIV Merck vaccine study: a step back or a launching point for future vaccine development?”

It was the latter. Merck’s HIV-vaccine failure prodded more study of other adenoviruses like Ad26—the vector for J&J’s Covid-19 vaccine. The Dutch biotech company Crucell had been experimenting with Ad26 in a vaccine to prevent malaria and other infectious diseases. Unlike with Ad5, antibodies to Ad26 didn’t appear to sabotage the vaccine. In 2009, J&J entered into a partnership with Crucell to develop a vaccine it hoped could someday prevent infection from all influenza strains. Two years later, J&J bought Crucell for $2.4 billion.

“At that time we had little to no experience in vaccines,” Mr. Gorsky says. But capitalism entails risk: Many Crucell vaccine studies failed, and “we ended up writing down a very significant portion of our initial investment.” Still, Crucell brought along “two really important technologies that gave seed to what we’re doing today.”

One was the AdVac platform. The other was the PER.C6 manufacturing technology, capable of mass-producing vaccines quickly and cheaply. Despite earlier failures, J&J continued to work on vaccines for Ebola, HIV, Zika and respiratory syncytial virus, all of which are prevalent in developing countries.

The company has enrolled more than 150,000 patients in vaccine trials for these diseases, and last summer the European Medicines Agency approved its Ebola vaccine. Mr. Gorsky says the trials for other diseases have made the company confident that its vaccine platform is safe, even among people who have pre-existing immunity to its Ad26 vector.

Conducting trials in the developing world also gave the company’s scientists confidence and knowledge to run global trials for its Covid vaccine. Most participants in J&J’s Covid vaccine trial lived outside the U.S.—12.7% in South Africa, 17.3% in Brazil and 23.3% in five other Latin American countries. Trials in South Africa and Brazil showed that J&J’s vaccine could prevent severe illness and deaths even against new variants.

“When we were debating clinical trial sites, and we asked could they logistically do this, some of our scientists had personally visited them and said, ‘They can absolutely do this, and I can vouch and validate that they can,’ ” Mr. Gorsky says. “That’s ultimately what put us in a position to be able to do such a high-quality trial at that particular moment, even in the face of those kinds of challenges.”

J&J was a couple of months behind some other vaccine manufacturers, in part because its scientists had to make trade-offs to create a single-shot vaccine that could be mass-produced and rapidly distributed, including in developing countries. A single dose needed to produce a robust immune reaction, but not a reaction so strong that it caused severe side effects.

“We developed more than a dozen different permutations,” Mr. Gorsky says, “and then we put them through some initial testing and selected our one candidate that we felt we could get the optimal balance.” J&J’s vaccine works by using its AdVac platform to transport the DNA that codes for the spike protein on the surface of the coronavirus into human cells.

J&J then worked closely with the FDA and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, another federal agency, on clinical trials and distribution. Mr. Gorsky says that in his 30 years working in the pharmaceutical industry, he has never seen as much collaboration between drug makers and government, with which “we were sharing information in real time.” Drug makers have also teamed up: “We all knew that, while we competed in the marketplace, the real competition here is the coronavirus.”

Merck recently agreed to produce J&J vaccines in its factories. In January Merck stopped development of its two Covid-19 vaccine candidates after early clinical trials showed weak immune responses. Merck’s vaccines used different virus vectors than J&J’s, but one had shown success against Ebola.

J&J’s vaccine is the third to obtain FDA approval, but preliminary results from trials on [AstraZeneca](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/AZN) and [Novavax](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/NVAX) suggest they are also highly effective. All these Covid-19 vaccines use innovative technologies that have been developed and tested over decades on other diseases. AstraZeneca’s vaccine is similar to J&J’s, but uses a chimpanzee adenovirus as a vector. The Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines inject the virus’s genetic code via mRNA, which instructs human cells to produce pseudo-spike proteins, which in turn prompts an immune response. Novavax’s vaccine uses re-engineered spike-protein clones.

About 85% of vaccine candidates fail in trials, and those that succeed have historically taken 10 to 15 years to develop. It seems like an incredible stroke of luck and science that we have so many Covid-19 vaccines so soon. But it’s more than that. Credit years of research and investment by drug makers, as well as government collaboration during the pandemic, which Mr. Gorsky hopes will outlast the pandemic.

“I think this is a golden moment, not only for Johnson & Johnson, but the biopharmaceutical industry,” he says. “We fundamentally believe that having a market-based, innovation-based, biopharmaceutical as well as a medical-technology environment, is critical long term to produce the best overall outcomes for healthcare.”

# 2NC vs Houston FL

## Case

### 1NC 2 – Reg Cap

#### Reg cap solves –

#### Regulated capitalism is key---alternative systems fail to innovate sufficiently.

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Nonetheless, the abolition of capitalism is not the solution. The last century witnessed a large-scale experiment with an alternative system—a system of central planning in the Soviet Union and other communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This system failed to offer individuals the freedom and economic incentives necessary for frontier innovation, and so these nations were unable to get beyond an intermediate level of development. Henri Weber, a well-known figure of the French movement of May 1968, was a former Trotskyist leader in the 1960s and 1970s but later became a leader of the French Socialist Party and Socialist member of the European Parliament. He explained his personal conversion to the free market economy and social democracy, looking to the Scandinavian experience: “Having witnessed from a front-row seat the disaster of collectivization of agriculture and firms in the Soviet Union, the Scandinavian Socialists were the first to break with the dogma of socializing means of production and managing the economy by a central planning committee. To control and humanize the economy, it is altogether unnecessary to expropriate management, to nationalize firms, or to eradicate the market . . . altogether unnecessary to deprive society of the creativity, knowhow, and dynamism of entrepreneurs. Under certain conditions, entrepreneurial talent can be mobilized to serve the common good.” A market economy, because it induces creative destruction, is inherently disruptive. But historically it has proved to be a formidable engine of prosperity, hoisting our societies to levels of development unimaginable two centuries ago. Must we therefore resign ourselves to the serious pitfalls and defects of capitalism as the necessary price to pay to generate prosperity and overcome poverty?

In this book, we have sought to better understand how growth through creative destruction interacts with competition, inequality, the environment, finance, unemployment, health, happiness, and industrialization, and how poor countries catch up to rich ones. We have analyzed to what degree the state, with appropriate control of the executive, can stimulate the creation of wealth while at the same time tackling the problems mentioned above. We have seen how, by moving from laissez-faire capitalism, with market forces given free rein, to a form of capitalism in which the state and civil society play their full role, it is possible to stimulate social mobility and reduce inequality without discouraging innovation. We have also seen how appropriate competition policies can curb the decline of growth and how we can redirect innovation toward green technologies to combat global warming. We have seen that, without forgoing globalization, a country can improve its competitiveness through innovative investments and put in place effective safety nets to protect individuals who lose their jobs. Lastly, we have seen how, with the indispensable support of civil society, it is possible to prevent yesterday’s innovators, in collusion with public officials, from pulling up the ladder behind themselves to block the path of tomorrow’s innovators.

Their answers about capitalism writ-large or as is – winning the capacity for cap to change/cap isn’t intrinsically bad is a neg ballot – they completely conceded the Budolfson warrant

### Sustainability---2NC

#### Aff sustainability claims are a Malthusian trap---innovation solves.

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In Chapter 2, we discussed the Malthusian trap: long-term growth is impossible in this model because every gain in productivity generates a demographic expansion that brings GDP per capita back to subsistence level. This paradigm may seem extreme but in reality many of our fellow citizens are Malthusians without realizing it, like Monsieur Jourdain of Molière’s Le Bourgeois gentilhomme [The Middle-Class Gentleman], who speaks in prose without knowing it. This is in any case true of those who advocate for “antigrowth” as the only possible response to the constraints of limited natural resources and the urgency of climate change. Their viewpoint can be expressed as follows.

Consider an economy whose growth comes entirely from capital accumulation, in which the final production of consumer goods (known as final production) requires both capital and the extraction of natural resources. The accumulation of capital—investment—is equal to savings, and savings represents part of final production, the remainder being devoted to consumption.3 Suppose that the stock of natural resources is limited. We can prove two propositions that remain valid whether returns to capital accumulation increase or decrease with the amount of accumulated capital. First, the economy is bound to stagnate in the very long term; second, a slowdown of growth in the short term will prolong the economy’s lifespan.

To prove that the economy is bound to stagnate in the very long term, one reasons by contradiction. Suppose that the economy were to continue to grow indefinitely at a positive rate. It follows that final production would not converge toward zero over time. For this to be the case, the flow extraction of natural resources must continue above a certain level. But then the stock of natural resources will end up being depleted in a finite time. Once the stock is depleted, final production falls to zero, which contradicts the initial assumption of ever-increasing final production. Therefore, the only possible rate of growth over the long term is zero.

The second proposition—that slowing growth in the short term prolongs the lifespan of the economy—results directly from the fact that any slowdown of the economy in the short run saves natural resources, thereby making it possible to extract those resources over a longer period, which prolongs the time during which final goods can be produced.

It was this very logical and persuasive reasoning that inspired the champions of zero growth in the 1970s. The same reasoning drives the advocates of antigrowth. Can we escape this logic? Just as in the case of the Malthusian trap, the answer can be summed up in a single word: innovation. Only innovation can push back the limits of what is possible. Only innovation has the potential to improve quality of life while using fewer and fewer of our natural resources and emitting less and less carbon dioxide. Only innovation will enable us to discover new and cleaner sources of energy. For example, the introduction of nuclear power plants enabled France to reduce its CO2 emissions, and the development of renewable energies amplified this movement.

Creative destruction is a very powerful engine of change. Not only does it enable a new technology to replace an older one, it can also open the path to a radical change in production processes. And environmental urgency calls for radical change in some fields; for example, modifying the mix of energy sources to rely more on renewables requires the entire energy industry to change models. A critical question is whether innovation will be directed spontaneously toward less polluting technologies or toward technologies that use fewer natural resources, or whether, on the contrary, governmental intervention is necessary. We now turn our attention to this question.

### AT: Resource Scarcity

#### Growth is sustainable — tech removes dependence on nature and solves resource scarcity

Adjaye 15 — John Asafu-Adjaye (associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland), et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf

At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive. There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. 2 Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.

### AT: Populism

#### Concerns over populism are exaggerated---contractualist values maintain modern economic norms despite challenges

Michael Moussea 19. The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace. International Security 2019; 44 (1): 160–196. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352>

Reports of the Demise of the Liberal Order Are Greatly Exaggerated

I have argued that the liberal global order is on the rise; yet, liberal values around the world seem to be in retreat. In recent years, two contractualist states with populist governments—Hungary and Poland—have begun to embrace anti-immigrant and anti-globalization positions. In the United States, President Donald Trump appears to favor status values such as power, rank, and loyalty over contractualist values such as equity and respect for the rule of law. In foreign policy, Trump does not seem to share contractualists’ opposition to Russia’s efforts to sow chaos, and he sees trade in terms of winners and losers.

Reports of the demise of the liberal order, however, are greatly exaggerated. First, Hungary and Poland are newly contractualist states. The sociological nature of economic norms theory means that contractualist values should be more firmly rooted in older contractualist societies than in newer ones. This is corroborated with the natural experiment of Germany: in 1962 West Germany embraced contractualism (see table 1), but it was only after 1991 that East Germany could have become contractualist, when massive investments from the Federal Republic caused incomes in the marketplace to become higher than incomes obtainable from status relationships. Today, Germany’s populist movement is concentrated in the eastern part of the country and is largely nonexistent in the western part,83 which corroborates the expectation that some newly contractualist societies retain some of their status values even after a generation of robust opportunity in the marketplace. Deeper changes in values may not occur until generational cohorts initially socialized into status or axial economies have passed on.

Second, the electorates in most of the thirty-five contractualist states listed in table 1 in 2010 have not experienced substantial increases in populist sentiment. Italy’s Five Star movement is often called populist but largely because of its anti-immigrant stance. Although an embrace of immigrants would seem consistent with contractualist values, opposition to large numbers of immigrants is arguably a rational response to what is essentially a huge external shock that has intensified in recent years. Britons voted to leave the European Union, but largely because they believed they were being treated unfairly in it. The rejection of unfair terms of trade, whether perceived correctly or not, is consistent with contractualist values.

Third, the strength of institutions far exceeds that of any one person, including the president of the United States. Liberal values and institutions are rooted in contractualist economic norms and will not disappear simply because some leaders choose not to abide by them. For instance, although Trump may want the United States to withdraw from the North Atlantic alliance, this is not a view shared by Congress and the American people. Even members of Trump’s administration have often restrained him in ways consistent with contractualist values and institutions.84

In economic norms theory, the only way the United States’ contractualist values could shift to status or axial values would be through radical economic change. As mentioned above, economics is ultimately at the mercy of politics, as an inºuential coalition of rent-seekers could potentially collapse a contractualist economy by failing to sustain the highly inclusive marketplace or uphold the state’s credibility in enforcing of contracts. In recent years, the U.S. economy has begun tilting toward rent-seekers, given the growing role of private money in electoral campaigns and the increasing sophistication of rent seekers in masking their activities though the manipulation of public opinion, including through their concentrated ownership of media outlets. Such rentierism could precipitate a change in U.S. values if it results in a retraction of the market substantial enough that newer generations began to obtain higher wages in newfound status networks than in the marketplace.

In this way, the Trump phenomenon may reflect a pathology in U.S. governing institutions; but at least so far, it arguably has not extended to the American people. Most of Trump’s supporters seem to be drawn to him not for his expressions of status values, but for his pledges to fight a “rigged” system and create well-paying jobs. Whether or not Trump means what he says, many of his supporters saw a vote for him as an act of protest against the increasing corruption occurring in the United States, a clear contractualist expression.85 Although a collapse of the U.S. economy and transition to an axial or a status economy is always possible, the feedback loop of popular insistence on economic growth and a highly inclusive marketplace makes this unlikely. Aside from an external shock (such as nuclear war or climate devastation), such a transition could happen only if the rentiers somehow manage to remain in power long enough to institutionalize a permanently underemployed underclass.

Fourth, even if the U.S. economy were to collapse and the United States became an axial or a status power, the combined economic might of all the other contractualist countries in the world is nearly twice that of the United States. The soft power of the United States in world politics lies not in its power to persuade, but in it being the largest of the contractualist states, and in its willingness to provide the public good of global security

since the collapse of the pound sterling in late 1946. If the United States withdrew from its leadership role, the remaining contractualist powers would fill the vacuum. None of them has an economy relatively large enough to enable it to act as a natural leader and principal provider of global security, but it is the temperament of these states that they can easily form an international organization to coordinate and act on their shared security interests, even if some may choose to free ride.

Fifth, current events need to be viewed within a larger context. Fernand Braudel pinpoints the rise of the modern world economy as starting around the year 1450 in northwestern Europe.86 The first contractualist economy emerged more than two centuries ago. Since then, contractualist states have confronted numerous shocks and threats to their systems, including the American Civil War, the Great Depression, two world wars, and the Cold War. The present populist mini-wave and pathologies in U.S. democracy are mere trifling episodes in a larger historical frame.

### 1NC 3 - Innovation

#### US-China competition isn’t defined by military strength, but relative innovation capacity. Outpacing China is the only way to prevent a war.

James Lewis 18. Senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Technological Competition and China.” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/technological-competition-and-china>.

The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions.

The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace.

Innovation has become a central element of its international influence. This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership.

Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.

### 1NC 5 – Cap Renewables

#### Past the tipping point and the alt is dictatorship and genocide---only tech can solve.

Eric Levitz 5/17/21. Senior Writer at New York Magazine. MA Johns Hopkins. "We’ll Innovate Our Way Out of the Climate Crisis or Die Trying". Intelligencer. 5-17-2021. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/climate-biden-green-tech-innovation.html

Today’s best-case ecological scenario was a horror story just three decades ago. In 1993, Bill Clinton declared that global warming presented such a profound threat to civilization that the U.S. would have to bring its “emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.” Instead, we waited until 2020 to do so; in the interim, humanity burned more carbon than it had since the advent of agriculture. Now, it will take a historically unprecedented, worldwide economic transformation to freeze warming at “only” 2 degrees — a level of temperature rise that will turn “once in a century” storms into annual events, drown entire island nations, and render major cities in the Middle East uninhabitable in summertime (at least for those whose lifestyles involve “walking outdoors without dying of heatstroke”). This is what passes for a utopian vision in 2021. If we confine ourselves to mere optimism — and assume that every Paris Agreement signatory meets its current pledged target for decarbonization — then warming will hit 2.4 degrees by century’s end.

The reality of our ecological predicament invites denial of our political one. Put simply, it is hard to reconcile the scale of the climate crisis with the limits of contemporary American politics. Delusions rush in to fill the gap. Among these is the fantasy of national autonomy; the notion that the United States can save the planet or destroy it, depending on the precise timeline of its domestic decarbonization. A rapid energy transition in the U.S. is a vital cause, not least for its potential to expedite similar transformations abroad. But the battle for a sustainable planet will be won or lost in the developing world. Although American consumption played a central role in the history of the climate crisis, it is peripheral to the planet’s future: Over the coming century, U.S. emissions are expected to account for only 5 percent of the global total.

There is also the delusion of “de-growth’s” viability. The fact that there is no plausible path for global economic expansion that won’t entail climate-induced death and displacement has led some environmentalists to insist on global stagnation. Yet there is neither a mass constituency for this project, nor any reason to believe that there will be any time soon. Freeze the status-quo economy in amber, and you’ll condemn nearly half of humanity to permanent poverty. Divide existing GDP into perfectly even slices, and every person on the planet will live on about $5,500 a year. American voters may express a generalized concern about the climate in surveys, but they don’t seem willing to accept even a modest rise in gas prices — let alone a total collapse in living standards — to address the issue. Meanwhile, any Chinese or Indian leader who attempted to stymy income growth in the name of sustainability would be ousted in short order. It’s conceivable that one could radically reorder advanced economies in a manner that enabled living standards to rise even as GDP fell; Americans might well find themselves happier and more secure in an ultra-low-carbon communal economy in which individual car ownership is heavily restricted, and housing, healthcare, and myriad low-carbon leisure activities are social rights. But nothing short of an absolute dictatorship could affect such a transformation at the necessary speed. And the specter of eco-Bolshevism does not haunt the Global North. Humanity is going to find a way to get rich sustainably, or die trying.

Thus, the chasm between the ecologically necessary and the politically possible can only be bridged by technological advance. And on that front, the U.S. actually has the resources to make a decisive contribution to global decarbonization — and some political will to leverage those resources. Unfortunately, due to some combination of fiscal superstitions and misplaced priorities, the Biden administration’s proposed investments in green innovation remain paltry. An American Jobs Plan with much higher funding for green R&D is both imminently winnable and environmentally imperative. U.S. climate hawks should make securing such legislation a top priority.

The choice before us is techno-optimism or barbarism.

If governments are forced to choose between increasing income growth in the present, and mitigating temperature rise in the future, they are going to pick the former. We’ll get cheap, lab-grown Kobe beef before we get a U.S. Senate willing to tax meat, and steel plants powered by “green hydrogen” before we get anarcho-primitivism with Chinese characteristics.

The question is whether we’ll get such breakthroughs before it’s too late.

Techno-optimism has its hazards, but the progress we’ve made toward decarbonization has come largely through technological innovation. When India canceled plans to construct 14 gigawatts of new coal-fired power stations in 2019, it did not do so in deference to international pressure or domestic environmental movements, but rather to the cost-competitiveness of solar energy. The same story holds across Asia’s developing countries: Thanks to a ninefold reduction in the cost of solar energy over the past decade, the number of new coal plants slated for construction in the region has fallen by 80 percent. Meanwhile, the road to an electric-car revolution was cleared by a collapse in the cost of lithium batteries, the challenge of powering cities with solar energy on cloudy days was eased by a 70 percent drop in the price of utility-scale batteries, and wind power grew 40 percent cheaper. Our species remains lackluster at solidarity and self-government, but we’ve got a real knack for building cool shit.

The technological progress of the past decade was not sufficient to compensate for tepid climate policy. But real techno-utopianism has never been tried: As of 2019, global spending on clean energy R&D totaled $22 billion a year, or 3 percent of the Pentagon’s annual budget. Increasing spending on such research — while expediting cost-reductions in existing technologies by deploying them en masse — should be twin priorities of American climate policy.

The preconditions for green industrialization can be made in America.

The United States has more fiscal capacity and better-financed research universities than any nation on the planet. And, for all the pathologies of our politics, public investment in green tech inspires far weaker opposition than many less-indispensable climate policies. In fact, late last year, with Republicans controlling the Senate and Donald Trump in the White House, the U.S. increased funding for zero-emission technology R&D by $35 billion. America does not have sovereignty over enough humans to save the planet by slashing our domestic emissions. But we just might have the resources and political economy necessary to help the developing world save us all.

Although progress on renewables has exceeded optimistic expectations, the technical obstacles to global decarbonization remain immense. In the most optimistic scenario, scaling up existing, cost-competitive technologies can get us about 16 percent of the emissions reductions necessary for achieving net-zero by 2050, according to the International Energy Agency. Driving down the price of tech we already have will get us another 39 percent. The rest must come from technologies that have yet to be fully developed. We need electrified cement, hydrogen-powered steel plants, and evaporative cooling. We need utility-scale energy storage, electric airplanes, and ultra-high voltage transmission lines. And we’d be remiss to not toss a bit of our collective wealth at game-changing hail marys like nuclear fusion.

#### There’s no link between economic growth and emissions---there’s progress in renewables.

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Third, **history** strongly refutes the notion that there’s **any necessary link between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions.** Consider the case of Britain, where modern economic growth began. British emissions of carbon dioxide have been **falling for half a century**, despite a growing economy. On a per-capita basis, Britain’s CO₂ emissions are back **down to what they were in the ’50s** — the 1850s, when real G.D.P. per person was only about **one-ninth what it is today.** Finally, Republican insistence that we must remain dependent on fossil fuels is especially strange, given **huge technological progress in renewable energy** — progress so remarkable that the Trump administration tried to force power companies to keep using coal, which is **no longer** competitive on cost. Improved technology means that climate action looks far easier now than it did in, say, 2008, when John McCain called for a cap on greenhouse gas emissions, a position that would be disqualifying for anyone seeking the Republican presidential nomination today.

### 1NC 6 – Cap War

#### Capitalism creates world peace---large powers are incentivized to limit conflict and weak powers are constrained

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Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states’ concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conºict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides’s Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek’s claim that Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

**This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime.** Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. **War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order.** In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states**. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.**

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in **permanent world peace**

, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; **these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear** and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, **there can be no competition for leadership among market powers**, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to **preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of selfdetermination**. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states’ alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states’ interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states’ behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other’s regime types.10 **In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11**

I begin by explaining how a robust internal market can affect a society’s values and institutions. Next, I discuss how a state’s internal values and institutions can influence its foreign policy interests. After identifying the market oriented states, I describe the hegemony of market states and argue that its power may be reaching the point where it cannot be seriously challenged. After reporting the results of my tests of the theory, I explain why hegemonic war cannot happen and how market hegemony, by bolstering states’ internal markets, is causing the decline of war. I follow this with discussions of the security implications of China’s rise for the global market order and why predictions of the demise of the liberal order are greatly exaggerated. I conclude with a few thoughts on some of the implications of my argument, including how the world is on a centuries-long trajectory of profound change toward permanent peace.

### 1NC 8 – Financialization

#### Critics of financialization have existed for decades but long term evidence points towards economic strength.

Steven N. Kaplan 17. Research Associate from the University of Chicago. "Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts“. National Bureau of Economic Research. June 2017. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w23464>

U.S. companies are frequently criticized for focusing too much on the short run and not enough on the long run. For example, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, one of the largest money managers, wrote that “the effects of the short-termist phenomenon are troubling . . . more and more corporate leaders have responded with actions that can deliver immediate returns to shareholders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, while underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth.”1 The Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity (co-chaired by Larry Summers) similarly weighed in, “An additional reason for the absence of inclusive prosperity is the changing nature of corporate behavior. Business leaders, government officials and academics have pointed out that corporations have shifted their traditional focus on long-term profit maximization to maximizing short-term stock-market valuations. One reason that economists have advanced for this transition to corporate short- termism is the overwhelming shift to stock-market-based compensation for CEOs and other highly compensated executives at publicly traded corporations.”2

In other words, these critics argue that US companies as a group destroy value by not investing for the long run. More formally, the short-term argument can be summarized as follows. U.S companies as a group underinvest in capital expenditures as well as research and development. According to the argument, this benefits the companies in the short- term, but harms the companies in the long run where the short-term is usually defined as the current quarter or, perhaps, current year or two, while the long-term would be more than five years out. Poor corporate governance and overly generous pay plans for CEOs that reward short-term behavior are often cited as accomplices to short-termism.3

The critics also point to empirical evidence to support their positions. For example, Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 financial executives and find that 78 percent would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings. Others point to corporate dividends and buybacks. Lazonick (2014) shows that S&P 500 companies paid out over 90% of their net income in dividends and share repurchases, leaving little available for investment in the long-term. Lazonick and others contend that companies buy back their own stock to boost their share prices in the short run, regardless of the long-term impact.

These criticisms, however, are not new. They have been raised, prominently, in some form or another since the late 1970s. In this paper, I present those historical criticisms. I then consider the implications of sustained short-termism for corporate profits, venture capital investment and returns, private equity investment and returns, and corporate valuations. In fact, there is very little long-term evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the short-term critics.4

1. Some Short-termist History

The criticism that US companies are plagued by short-termism and poor governance has a long history. In 1980, Harvard Business School’s Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy wrote an influential article criticizing American companies for being too short-term oriented:

“By their preference for servicing existing markets rather than creating new ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and management by the numbers, many of them have effectively forsworn long-term technological superiority as a competitive weapon. In consequence, they have abdicated their strategic responsibilities.”

Similarly, Marty Lipton wrote in 1979:

“It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the long-term interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested . . . only in a quick profit . . . ?”

In 1992, Harvard’s Michael E. Porter repeated the argument:

“The U.S. system of allocating investment capital is failing, putting American companies at a serious disadvantage and threatening the long-term growth of the nation's economy… Many American companies invest too little, particularly in those intangible assets and capabilities required for competitiveness – R&D, employee training and skills development … The U.S. system, first and foremost advances the goals of shareholders at the expense of the long-term performance of American companies. In global competition, where investment increasingly determines a company's capacity to upgrade and innovate, the U.S. system does not measure up.”

And the short-term argument is being repeated today by the likes of Laurence Fink and Larry Summers. While some, like Fink, focus on public companies, the arguments of Abernathy and Hayes, Porter, Summers refer to the overall U.S. economy.

2. U.S. Corporate Profits

It is clear from the previous section that critiques of U.S. businesses as overly short-term oriented have been with us for at least 35 years. And the criticisms have not changed much, if at all, in their basic tenor.

But, this has very strong implications for the short-term argument. It’s been more than 35 years since the publication of the Hayes and Abernathy article, and 25 years since the appearance of Porter’s. By any measure, today is the long-term that U.S. companies supposedly have underinvested in since the 1980s. Accordingly, the short-term logic implies that U.S. business should be performing poorly today.

But that is unequivocally not the case. Figure 1 reports U.S. corporate profits before tax as a fraction of GDP since 1951. Today, corporate profits are near all-time highs (over that postwar period). The uptrend began just around the time of the Hayes and Abernathy article, and has continued since.

The early 1980s is precisely the time that many observers believe finance and the goal of shareholder value maximization became ascendant. It is also the time that Wall Street and the financial sector began to grow substantially—both in the US and internationally. The early 1980s also coincided with the rise of management consultants who spread techniques across US firms and across the world.5 In 1980, consulting firms were relatively new and relatively small. Today, McKinsey & Company has offices in more than 60 countries; the Boston Consulting Group has offices in more than 40. And the early 1980s also coincided with an explosion in information technology and globalization.

Consistent with the increase in corporate profits, both Autor et al. (2017) and Burkai (2016) explore explanations for the strong corporate profitability and, concomitant, weak labor share of GDP.

Whatever its source, the strong profitability of U.S. corporations is difficult for the shorttermists to explain. It is obviously not consistent with poor corporate performance over the longterm. Nevertheless, short-termists continue to repeat the criticisms of the 1980s and 1990s.

It is worth adding that the strong corporate performance also is inconsistent with poor corporate governance overall, suggesting that criticisms of U.S. corporate governance also are overstated. This is arguably the type of example that the quote by John Stuart Mill that begins this paper had in mind.

### 1NC 12 – Growth

#### Growth is good and there’s no transition---industrial ag feeds billions and degrowth won’t persuade anybody.

Collin Chambers 21. Writer for the Liberation School. "Degrowth: An environmental ideology with good intentions, bad politics." Liberation School. 7-20-2021. https://liberationschool.org/degrowth-a-politics-for-which-class/

Proponents of degrowth argue that there are absolute “planetary limits” and a fixed “carrying capacity” that cannot be surpassed by humans if we want to avoid ecological collapse. This is not only pessimistic in that it dismisses the idea that, under socialism, we could figure out new sustainable ways to grow, but it’s also completely devoid of class analysis. There’s no distinction between socially-produced limits and natural limits.

Degrowth is anti-modern, anti-technological, and anti-large scale production and infrastructure. Kallis argues that “only social systems of limited size and complexity can be governed directly rather than by technocratic elites acting on behalf of the populace… Many degrowth advocates, therefore, oppose even ‘green’ megastructures like high-speed trains or industrial-scale wind farms[!]” [13].

The same can be said about degrowth solutions to the problems the capitalist agricultural system creates. Proponents of degrowth propose small scale (both urban and rural) methods of agriculture production to replace industrial-scale agriculture. They, in fact, glorify and romanticize “peasant economies.”

Despite the problems of capitalist industrial agriculture, there are two main benefits of industrial-scale agriculture. First, it has drastically increased yields. At the present moment, there is enough food produced to feed 11 billion people. Second, industrial farming has thoroughly decreased the backbreaking labor needed for agricultural and food production. In 1790, 90 percent of the U.S. workforce labored on farms. In 1900, it was 35 percent[.] At the present moment, only one percent of the U.S. workforce works on farms [14].

Certainly, in any just society we would want to spread out food production more evenly amongst the population. But getting rid of industrial-scale agriculture and reverting to small-scale peasant and small landowner agriculture would require massive numbers of workers to go back to the land and perform backbreaking agricultural work. Such a transformation would inevitably reduce agricultural yield substantially, increasing the possibility of food insecurity and hunger among vast swathes of the population. And what would we do with the commodities and infrastructure we’d have to destroy to create such plots of land? Moreover, such a vision necessitates the redistribution of land from private ownership of large landholders. Is this achieved through revolution or through governmental reforms? In either case, if we’re struggling to reclaim land then why not broaden our horizons and redistribute land in the interests of the environment and the people, including Indigenous and other oppressed nations in the U.S.?

Degrowth is, furthermore, idealist and divorced from the material reality within which U.S. workers currently live. Matt Huber, a Marxist environmental geographer, argues that a “truly humane society must commit to relieving the masses from agricultural labor,” and that we cannot act as if “small-scale agricultural systems are much of a ‘material basis’ for a society beyond industrial capitalism” [15]. This is not to say that small-scale and urban farming are undesirable, but that they’re insufficient in a country like the U.S. The Cuban model of urban farming and agriculture–which is a heroic achievement of the Cuban Revolution–can’t simply be mapped onto this country or the rest of the world.

Additionally, we shouldn’t forgo modern technologies that already exist just because they are “large scale” or because they currently contribute to environmental degradation within capitalist society. Doing so would in effect produce more ecological waste!

In an important piece on capitalism and ecology, Ernest Mandel writes: “it is simply not true that modern industrial technology is inevitably geared towards destroying the environmental balance. The progress of the exact sciences opens up a very wide range of technical possibilities” [16]. Increased rates of pollution and environmental degradation occur because capitalists pursue profits at the expense of the environment, not because of the technologies themselves. Socialists have to distinguish between instruments of production and their use under capitalism.

Degrowth and building the class struggle

In the U.S., degrowth remains an ideology that is relatively socially isolated but gaining influence among environmentalists and some on the left. It’s an ideology of guilt rather than revolutionary action. The ideas from degrowth will not appeal to masses of exploited and oppressed people who actually need more, not less. Imagine, for example, canvassing and talking to people in working-class neighborhoods, trying to get them on board with a degrowth political platform. How do degrowth proponents think workers in oppressed neighborhoods respond if they were told they needed to consume less to fight climate change? Many of us already wait as long as possible in the winter to turn on our heat! As organizers, we would not get the time of day, and we wouldn’t even believe ourselves. Can you imagine organizing homeless and unemployed workers around a program of less consumption? Degrowth is an ideology fit for the privileged, and if they want to consume less, they should.

From the perspective of the practical class struggle, degrowth is particularly problematic. Degrowth has a rhetorical strategy problem. In an unequal country such as the U.S., is the discourse of less and “self-limitation” realistic and inspiring? Is this tactic energizing, does it speak to the needs of the exploited and oppressed, can it mobilize people into action?